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Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) frequently establish rigid routines and have 
difficulties flexibly applying what they have learned.  Three experiments were conducted to 
examine generalized event representation in 34 pre-school children.  In Experiment 1, children 
diagnosed with varying kinds of cognitive and language delays (CLD: n = 14) were tested with 
the generalized imitation paradigm, a reliable measure of representational capacity. Two sets of 
perceptually dissimilar objects with similar functions were used to perform the same task: one set 
consisted of modeling props and the other set was the generalization props.  At the generalization 
assessment, children observed actions modeled by the experimenter, after which they were given 
different sets of objects (varying in size, shape, color and texture, but have the same function as 
the modeled props) that they could use to generalize the events.  At the imitation assessment, 
children again observed actions modeled by the experimenter, but were given the same set of 
objects that the experimenter had used.  The order in which the individual actions were modeled 
was causal (the actions must be produced in a particular order to achieve a goal), arbitrary (the 
actions can be produced in any order with the same resulting outcome), or conventional (e.g., 
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bedtime stories are typically read after the child is in bed).  This procedure was administered for 
eight tasks (4 novel events, 4 familiar events). The dependent measures were the mean 
proportion of actions and the mean proportion of correctly ordered sequences in which the 
actions were produced.  Experiment 2 was conducted on adults to empirically confirm that the 
objects used for modeling and generalization were indeed perceptually dissimilar, but similar in 
function.  Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 1, and was conducted on children 
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD: n = 10) and typically developing controls (TD: 
n = 10).  Comparative data revealed that all groups were able to generalize and imitate actions 
and sequences compared to their baseline assessments.  Although all three groups generalized 
fewer causal actions than arbitrary and conventional ones, ASD children performed as well as 
TD children.  However, it was the CLD children that showed more differences, generalizing 
substantially fewer causal actions than the other groups.  Furthermore, productive language 
obtained from verbal IQ data was also related to generalization ability: CLD children with higher 
verbal IQ generalized better on these tasks than those with lower IQ.  There were no diagnostic 
differences found for sequences, indicating that although participants found generalizing some 
actions to be problematic, their sequential understanding of events remained intact. The null 
result of the ASD group compared to the TD group in this sample provides evidence that 
children with ASD demonstrate certain cognitive strengths.   Although in real world contexts, 
insistence on sameness can hinder learning and generalized event representation in children with 
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CHAPTER I.     INTRODUCTION 
Typically developing children compose, systematize, and make representations of 
everyday events as they encounter them.  Routines such as getting dressed in the 
morning, having breakfast, bathing, going to the supermarket, and preparing for bedtime 
occur on a regular basis.  Each of these activities includes actors, related objects, and 
actions performed in a particular sequence.  Children learn these routines early in life, 
and can use them to form expectations about novel events (e.g., eating dinner at a friend’s 
house).  This kind of memory is called generalized event representation. 
Research on how infants and young children remember events composed of 
organized action sequences has shown that event knowledge takes place from a very 
early age and temporal orders governed by causal connections are recalled more often 
than those with arbitrary orders.  Children around 3- 6-months of age can also learn a task 
using one set of objects and can carry it out on a different set of objects (Barnat, Klein & 
Meltzoff, 1996; Bauer & Dow, 1994; McDonough & Mandler, 1998).  This kind of 
generalization is not attributable to forgetting (as found in research with younger infants 
using conditioning paradigms; see Borovsky & Rovee-Collier, 1990) because these older 
infants can also remember which objects they saw the activities modeled on before.  
Regarding the types connecting relations (causal, arbitrary, conventional), typically 
developing children tend to imitate higher proportions of causal actions and sequences 
than arbitrary actions and sequences in novel tasks (Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Thal, 1990).  
Causal sequences require that all actions must be performed in a particular order to 
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achieve the end result (one must open a juice carton before pouring its contents).  With 
arbitrary sequences, there is more than one way to achieve the end result (e.g. the order in 
which we put clothes on).  Conventional, or familiar sequences may include causal and 
arbitrary actions, but are typically done in one particular way based on social norms 
(breakfast is typically eaten in the morning but could be made and eaten anytime during 
the day). There have also been instances, however, in which actions and sequences that 
are arbitrarily ordered are readily generalized, while those that are causally ordered are 
difficult for young children to generalize (Bauer & Dow, 1994).  A reason for why 
causally ordered actions are difficult to order has not been offered. 
 Previous research has provided insight about the extent to which typically 
developing infants and young children are able to abstract what they know and apply this 
knowledge to novel situations.  To date, little to no research has been conducted on 
generalization and everyday event representations of children with intellectual disabilities 
(but see Cheatham, Bauer & Georgieff, 2006).  This is important because if researchers 
are interested in designing training programs for individuals with intellectual disabilities, 
it is not only important to know that these children are capable of retaining information, 
but also that they are able to apply this knowledge to different contexts.  Autism, in 
particular, is a complex neurodevelopmental disorder that presents with difficulties in 
communication and social interaction as well as engagement in restricted and repetitive 
behaviors (RRBs).  Perseveration of sameness, an RRB subtype, refers to restricted 
interests, and engagement in rigid routines and rituals, which hinders cognitive flexibility.  
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In order to address inadequacies of recognition and appropriate reactions to emotional 
and social cues by individuals with autism, there has been extensive focus on teaching 
behavioral scripts. Behavioral scripts are designed to teach appropriate behavior by 
providing guidelines that prompt awareness to social norms (Bock, 2007; Wang & 
Spillane, 2009).  However, there is limited research investigating whether or not 
individuals with autism spontaneously acquire cognitive scripts about everyday event 
knowledge, and if they do, the extent to which they can generalize this knowledge to 
other novel events. 
The current experiments are the first to investigate generalized event 
representation as a function of action and sequence relations (causal, arbitrary, 
conventional) in pre-school children with mild- to high-functioning autism spectrum 
disorder and children with other cognitive and language delays.  The method employed is 
the generalized imitation paradigm (Bauer, 2002; Mandler & McDonough, 1996; 1998), 
which is an appropriate measure of representational capacity.  Each task consists of 
several props, in which imitation in a particular sequential order is necessary for task 
completion.  For each test event, the stimuli that the children receive for generalization 
were perceptually dissimilar to the modeling props, yet retained their functional 
similarity.  One goal of the current study was to increase ecological validity in an effort 
to reflect real world settings, which is especially important for children with ASD.  With 
this measure, actions are modeled with miniature, realistic-looking objects in a particular 
sequence that is naturalistic and not awkward.  Generalization with other realistic objects 
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is assessed.  Event representation is assessed by the extent to which children are able to 
use the substitution props to the original while recalling the sequences in the correct order 
in which they were modeled. 
Overview of the Dissertation Sections 
 The introduction is a literature review on previous research in event 
representation and generalization abilities in typically developing children, children with 
cognitive and language delays (CLD), and children diagnosed with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD).  Section 1 defines autism and provides a historical account of its causes.  
Section 2 outlines the rationale for the current diagnostic classification of autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) according to the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), and provides 
information about ASD symptomatology.  Perseveration on sameness, one of the core 
characteristics of ASD that affects generalization ability, is defined thoroughly in Section 
3.   Section 4 briefly defines event representation and describes why generalization is an 
essential cognitive skill.  Categorization, which serves as a foundation for generalization 
skills, is defined in Section 5.  This section also recounts extensive research on 
categorical development in typically developing children.  Section 6 discusses previous 
research on young children’s ability to generalize the function of objects. Section 7 
explains how objects are related to everyday events and the importance of sequential 
understanding.  Section 8 is a review of previous research on event representation in 
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children with ASD.  Section 9 summarizes the purpose of the current research proposes 
various hypotheses. 
 The dissertation research is presented in Chapter II, which is subdivided into three 
experiments.  Experiment 1 investigates generalized event representation in children with 
various cognitive and language delays (CLD).  Experiment 2 is an internal validity check 
to ascertain whether the two sets of stimuli used in Experiment 1 were indeed different 
from each other with respect to perceptual between-category similarity.  Experiment 3 is 
a replication of Experiment 1 conducted on children with mild- to high- autism spectrum 
disorder and on typically developing controls. 
 Chapter III (General Discussion) provides a detailed explanation of the results of 
the performance of the TD, ASD, and CLD groups in the current experiments compared 
to previous research discussed in Section 1.  Sections 2 and 3 discuss limitations of the 
experiments, summarize the dissertation, and offer recommendations for future research. 
I.1 Historical Explanations for the Causes of Autism 
Autism, one of most common intellectual disabilities in the United States, is a 
neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by deficiencies in social interaction and 
reciprocity, challenges in communication, and repetitive, stereotyped behavior occurring 
before the age of three (Greenspan & Weider, 2006; Lord, 2011).  The term autism was 
originally coined by Bleuler in 1911 (Wing, 1997) to characterize the symptom 
associated with detached reality found in patients with schizophrenia.  However, Leo 
Kanner (1943) popularizes the label autism to describe the distinct pattern of social, 
	   6 
communicative, and repetitive behaviors based on detailed case studies he observed in a 
small group of children, diagnosing them with “early infantile autism.”  His vivid 
descriptions of behaviors that emphasized a lack of emotional responses in social 
situations, accompanied by eccentricities such as engagement in repetitive and/or 
stereotypic behaviors clearly distinguished these children from typically developing 
children.  Children with early infantile autism, he noted, were very resistant to change, 
had speech difficulties, and were socially aloof, yet they also displayed proficiency in 
rote memory and visual-spatial tasks.  The juxtaposition of social deficiency with 
components of normal cognitive intelligence was what Kanner believed made autism 
unique compared to other childhood disorders.  In 1944 Hans Asperger described his own 
observations of another set of behaviors, displayed by older children and adolescents that 
resembled early infantile autism, but was quite distinct.  Like autistic children, these older 
individuals also had restricted interests, deficits in social interaction and nonverbal 
communication; however, their linguistic production was intact and many had above 
average intelligence.   
 It is important to note that although Kanner and Asperger were considered 
pioneers for defining the symptomatology of autism, autistic-like symptoms have been 
chronicled as early as 1801 (Wing, 1997).  Victor, the “feral” child, who was found in his 
teenage years living in the woods of Averyron, France, is one such example (Bettelheim, 
1959).  He had no speech production despite many intervention attempts by French 
physician J.M.C. Itard.  According to Wing, whose article (1997) recounts the legend and 
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history of autism, J.M.C. Itard’s detailed account of Victor’s behavior described autistic 
tendencies.  Amala and Kamala, feral girls from Midnapore, exhibited extremely similar 
behavior to children as observed by Bruno Bettelheim at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic 
School at the University of Chicago (Bettelheim, 1959).    
 The classification of childhood disorders was first recommended by Henry 
Maudsley (1867; in Wing, 1997) and was slowly implemented thereafter.  Subtypes of 
childhood disorders began to emerge at the beginning of the twentieth century, which 
included children who, after developing normally, regressed in language ability, social 
skills, and cognitive functioning.   
 A few antiquated explanations for the cause of autism have been controversial.  
The most contentious, that autism was caused by a lack of maternal warmth and attention, 
was introduced by Kanner (1943; 1949).  Influenced by psychoanalytic theorists, Kanner 
proposed that the behaviors of autistic children resulted from parents who were also 
socially and emotionally detached and displayed aloof behavior towards their children.  
He concluded that the symptoms of autism emerged in children who were “kept neatly in 
refrigerators which did not defrost” (Kanner, 1973, p. 61).  Since the majority of children 
that he observed at the time had moderate intelligence and came from parents who were 
well educated, Kanner contended that the parents caused autistic behaviors by disrupting 
their children’s emotional well-being. This theory quickly gained approval in the 
scientific community.  Bruno Bettelheim, a staunch supporter of the refrigerator mother 
theory, propagandized this idea in a series of articles and books throughout the 1950’s 
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and 1960’s.  After witnessing the lack of affect and withdrawal exhibited by prisoners in 
German concentration camps that reminded him of autistic children, Bruno Bettelheim 
proposed that autistic symptoms were actually a coping mechanism to deal with the 
horrible emotional pain children endured at their parents’ hands (Seifert, 1990). 
According to Bettelheim (1967), “autism has essentially to do with everything that 
happens from birth on” (p. 393). Despite evidence suggesting otherwise, he argued that 
the autistic child is born with normal intelligence and the ability to communicate but 
chooses not to in order to defend him or herself from future trauma (Seifert, 1990).  
Although Kanner’s explanation, and Bettelheim’s promotion of the refrigerator mother 
theory, were responsible for feelings of intense guilt and blame in many parents of 
children with autism, these theories also led to the emergence of autism advocacy groups 
and organizations such as The National Autistic Society (Wing, 1997).  However, 
Bernard Rimland, a prominent psychologist, and founder of the Autism Research 
Institute and Autism Society of America, was also the parent of a son with autism, and 
strongly opposed the refrigerator mother hypothesis.  Although Rimland’s (1964) 
research on the neural implications of autism eventually convinced Kanner that autism 
was perhaps a neurological disorder, Bettelheim remained unmoved.   
 In hindsight, what Kanner may have observed was a possible correlation (and not 
a causal link) between lack of maternal affection and autistic behaviors in children.  
However, since we now know that lack of communication is a core symptom of autism, 
specifically, the failure to engage in social interaction, a plausible explanation is that 
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naturally, this lack of engagement of the child would also diminish social reciprocity by 
mothers over time.  Nevertheless, what Kanner and Bettelheim failed to investigate (and 
never addressed) was whether this pattern was evident in the same mothers toward their 
non-autistic children.   
Later research has explored the relationship between child-rearing methods and 
autistic symptoms in children.  The Strange Situation Procedure was a scenario 
developed by Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall (1978), which initially investigated 
attachment profiles of typically developing children with their caregivers.  In the 
procedure, the child experiences brief separation and reunion episodes with his or her 
caregiver in a laboratory setting.  Based on the emotional and behavioral responses 
displayed by infants during separation and reunion episodes, Ainsworth and colleagues 
determined that there are two discrete attachment patterns: secure and insecure.  The 
securely attached child tends to seek comfort from his/her caregiver.  By using the 
caregiver as a secure base, the child will independently explore the surrounding 
environment in the caregiver’s presence.  The child will naturally display behaviors of 
distress when separated from the caregiver, but is delighted when reunited.  Insecure 
attachment is subcategorized in three ways: resistant, avoidant, and disorganized.  
Insecure-resistant children are extremely distressed when parents leave them, and upon 
return, show conflicting behaviors of both contact seeking, and anger/resistance.  
Although the child is happy to be reunited with the caregiver, he or she displays anger for 
being left alone, and does not use the caregiver’s comfort to ease the distress.  Insecure-
	   10 
avoidant children show little distress when caregivers leave or return, essentially 
responding to the parent as they would a stranger.  The insecure-disorganized profile is 
typically found in children who have been abused or have sustained other unresolved 
trauma.  The child is thus faced with the dilemma of whether to flee to safety to the same 
person who is the source of the distress (the caregiver).  Because the parent’s behavior 
pattern is unpredictable, the child has no organized strategy from which to benefit.  
Therefore, these children respond by displaying bizarre or inhibited behavior upon the 
parent’s return.  In an attempt to seek comfort, the child may run to approach the parent, 
but then fearing to be in close proximity to the parent, the child may then hit the parent, 
or freeze, and run away.  
 Research using the Strange Situation Procedure has revealed that some children 
with autism do foster secure attachments with their parents (Rutgers, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2004).  The degree of security, 
however, is correlated with the level of functioning of the child.  For instance, children 
with autism who are low functioning tend to display more insecure and disorganized 
attachment relationships with their parents than their typically developing counterparts 
(van IJzendoorn, et al. 2007).  Findings by Haltigan, Ekas, Seifer & Messinger (2011) 
also revealed no differences in attachment security (secure, insecure, avoidant) of infant 
siblings of older children with autism (at least one sibling diagnosed) compared to infant 
siblings of typically developing older children.  A closer look within the secure 
attachment category revealed that the only difference between the groups was how 
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behaviors were expressed—autistic siblings tended to be “rarely distressed during 
separation” from parents; moreover, evidence of their secure attachment was revealed by 
highly indifferent, restrained demeanor.  On the other hand, securely attached, non-
autistic siblings showed more behaviors of frustration and distress upon separation; upon 
reunion, they maintained close contact with the parent.  Although both groups were 
classified as having secure attachment with their caregiver, variation emerged in terms of 
their emotional reactions towards their caregiver in the strange situation scenario. 
   Although the initial explanations of causes of autism have since been dispelled, 
the growing literature on autism has not determined any salient origin.  Instead, research 
suggests that although there is no single genetic marker (Abrahams & Geschwind, 2008), 
the etiology for autism includes genetic variations with possible influences from the 
environment (Lord & Bishop, 2010).  Evidence in support of a genetic basis for autism is 
found in sibling concordance rates and behavioral similarities of parents.  Furthermore, 
research has revealed higher prevalence rates of autism in intermarriage among first 
cousins in isolated areas of the world, specifically the Middle East (Kamer, Zohar, 
Youngmann, Diamond, Inbar & Senecky, 2004).  Because many children with genetic 
disorders such as tuberous sclerosis and Fragile X syndrome have shown expressions of 
autistic-like behavior (although these symptoms were not sufficient for official diagnosis; 
Lord & Bishop, 2010), some researchers have argued that the biological components of 
these disorders could also be genetically linked to autism (Cohen, Pichard, Tordjman, 
Baumann, Burglen, et al, 2005; Jensen & Spannagel, 2011).  
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 Formerly considered as a variant of schizophrenia in childhood, autism is 
currently recognized as a separate disorder.  Two features that distinguish schizophrenia 
from autism are the symptomatology and age of onset (Ghaziuddin, 2005).  
Schizophrenia is a psychotic disorder with symptoms of hallucinations, delusions, and 
disorganized thoughts.  The onset of schizophrenia typically emerges during late 
adolescence/early adulthood, and is rarely found in children (about 1 in 100 adults with 
schizophrenia showed symptoms in childhood; Reaven, Hepburn & Ross, 2008).  By 
contrast, symptoms of autism are marked by impairments in social interaction, 
communication and repetitive behavior, but do not include psychotic symptoms (e.g. 
hallucinations and delusions), and the typical age of onset is before the age of three.  
Furthermore, unlike schizophrenia, autism is highly co-morbid with mental retardation 
and seizure disorders (Ghaziuddin, 2005).  Despite researchers and clinicians treating 
schizophrenia and autism as markedly different disorders, recent research suggests that 
there may be some phenotypic overlap.  Although rare, in the subset of children 
diagnosed with schizophrenia (Childhood-Onset Schizophrenia, or COS), roughly 25% 
also had a comorbid diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) (Sporn, 
Addington, Gotnay, Ordonez, et al., 2004).  In addition, many children officially 
diagnosed with COS have had a history of socio-emotional deficits and language 
impairments that resemble PDD but have not been dually diagnosed on the autism 
spectrum (Reaven, Hepburn & Ross, 2008).  Furthermore, thought disorder and 
disorganized speech associated with schizophrenia may be misconstrued as having 
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pragmatic difficulties such as those associated with high functioning autism.  These 
special cases have sparked research interest because the presentation of autistic 
symptoms in some children with schizophrenia suggests that these two disorders may 
have phenotypic overlap.  A few studies have tested this possibility by administering 
autism evaluation scales, such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) 
(Sugihara, Tsuchiya & Takei, 2008) and the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire 
(BAP) (Reaven, Hepburn & Ross, 2008), to children and adults diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.  The studies revealed that individuals in these samples, who responded 
well to antipsychotic medications, scored high on the aforementioned autism diagnostic 
assessments, which are highly reliable.   
 It is important to note, however, that although these data seem to suggest that 
schizophrenia and autism share similarities of symptoms, Reaven and colleagues (2008) 
interpret this finding with caution.  While they concur with the large body of literature 
and the diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual that schizophrenia 
(including childhood-onset) and autism are indeed discrete disorders, they argue that 
current autism assessments are not sensitive enough to rule out psychotic and other 
psychiatric disorders.  Reaven et al. (2008) also argue that aloof presence and limited 
social interaction displayed by the participants may have been attributed to them being 
overwhelmed by the new environment (of the lab setting and the interviewer), and not 
due to inherent autistic tendencies.  Additionally, restricted, repetitive behaviors, 
echolalia, and the use of stereotyped speech, which are unique core deficits of autism, 
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were noticeably absent in the schizophrenic sample.  Therefore, both studies (Sugihara, 
Tsuchiya & Takei, 2008; Reaven, Hepburn & Ross, 2008) strongly suggest that autism 
diagnostic assessments must be valid and sensitive enough to include items that exclude 
individuals with schizophrenia to ensure that individuals are not misdiagnosed or over-
identified as having autism. 
I.2 Current Diagnostic Criteria of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
 Over the years, the nomenclature for autism has been modified to “autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD),” to acknowledge the disorder’s wide range of symptoms and 
characteristics.  ASD describes the distribution of individuals with associated 
symptomatology ranging from severe to mild (Jensen & Spannagel, 2011).  According to 
the DSM-IV-TR (4th ed., text. rev., DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000), ASD is a pervasive developmental disorder, which is characterized by abnormal, 
autistic-like functioning in three domains: a) social interaction and reciprocity; b) 
communication; and c) restricted and repetitive interests.  In this edition of the DSM, 
ASD included the following subcategories: autism, Asperger syndrome, pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), childhood disintegrative 
disorder, and Rett syndrome.  Asperger syndrome describes individuals on the spectrum 
with substantial difficulties with social interaction/reciprocity, problems interpreting 
nonverbal communication, and having stereotyped interests; however, their verbal 
abilities, and cognitive faculties are comparable to typically developing peers (Jensen & 
Spannagel, 2011).  PDD-NOS describes individuals who have met some of the criteria 
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for autism spectrum disorder (compared to other developmental disorders), but do not 
meet full criteria for autism or for Asperger syndrome (APA, 2000).  Childhood 
disintegrative disorder is a rare condition in which children develop normal cognitive, 
social, and motor functioning before age two, and within a period of months thereafter, 
display regression and substantial loss in functioning in these areas.  Rett syndrome is a 
genetic disorder caused by the X-linked MECP2 gene (encoding methyl-CpG-binding 
protein 2), and therefore, affects girls almost exclusively (Amir, Van den Veyver, Wan, 
Tran, Francke, & Zoghbi, 1999).  Like childhood disintegrative disorder, normal 
development is followed by a drastic regression of faculties.  However, the onset of 
symptoms of this progressive neurodevelopmental condition occurs much earlier (at 
around 6-18 months) and is more severe than childhood disintegrative disorder.  
Symptoms of Rett syndrome include poor muscle tone (hypotonia), language and speech 
loss, diminished purposeful hand use, and eventually, apraxia—the debilitating loss of all 
motor functions.   
There has been much disagreement regarding diagnostic consensus in 
distinguishing individuals on the spectrum according to these established subtypes. 
Walter Kaufmann, member of the Neurodevelopmental Disorders working group for the 
new diagnostic criteria for ASD (2012), outlined proposed changes for ASD in the DSM-
5.  According to Kaufmann, there appears to be a misrepresentation of PDD-NOS as high 
functioning autism (but not as high functioning to meet Asperger syndrome criteria). 
Because this particular subcategory has not been adequately defined, individuals may 
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have been misdiagnosed, resulting in an autism “epidemic” due to over identification in 
the ASD population.  Therefore, it was argued that as with any other “not otherwise 
specified (NOS)” subcategory for other mental disorders, this category should be also 
considered as “subthreshold symptomatology.”  PDD-NOS should only refer to 
individuals who either have severe social interaction and communication impairments, or 
display restricted activities/repetitive behaviors, but not both, which is why these cases do 
not meet full criteria for ASD.  Regarding Asperger syndrome, there is no research 
indicating that Asperger syndrome is a disorder that is discrete from autism.  Essentially, 
Asperger syndrome is high-functioning autism and should be specified as such.  Another 
justification for removal of this category is that there appears to be a differential rate of 
diagnosis related to race and SES, in which high-SES Caucasian males are more likely to 
be diagnosed with Asperger’s, whereas lower-SES non-Caucasian males and females are 
more likely to be diagnosed with PDD-NOS (Kaufmann, 2012).  One concern about the 
collapsing of Asperger syndrome into the larger ASD category (mostly by parents) is that 
it results in the loss of identity and uniqueness of the Asperger distinction.  However, it is 
important to note that many states deny access to services for children diagnosed with 
Asperger syndrome due to its high-functioning status, thus, merging it into the ASD 
category would enable these individuals to be eligible for the services they require. 
According to Catherine Lord (2010), clinicians and researchers have considered 
reclassification of childhood disintegrative disorder and Rett syndrome as “atypical 
autism” due to their statistical rarity in the ASD population.  Furthermore, autistic-like 
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behaviors in these disorders only appear during a brief period of development.  What 
generally differentiates children with these disorders from others on the spectrum is the 
profound regression/loss of motor symptoms, which is not a salient characteristic of 
ASD.  
The current edition of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th 
ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) has made several revisions 
to redefine the autism spectrum in an effort to reflect the core characteristics related to 
autism.  The first major change was to remove ASD as a subtype of “pervasive 
developmental disorders,” on the grounds that the symptoms expressed are actually not 
pervasive, but quite specific to social, communication, and restricted interests/stereotyped 
behaviors (Kaufmann, 2012).  Another change was shifting from a categorical approach 
to a dimensional classification approach; therefore, the current diagnostic criteria of ASD 
capture the previous (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnoses 
of autistic disorder, Asperger syndrome, PDD-NOS, childhood disintegrative disorder, 
and Rett syndrome, but currently these subcategories are subsumed into the larger 
category of “autism spectrum disorder.”  This singular diagnostic category of ASD 
appears to be the best representation of individuals who share the same common core 
symptoms of autism, and any variability among individuals should be described by 
clinical specifiers (i.e. level of severity, IQ) and any known comorbid disorders (i.e. 
Fragile X, intellectual disability, epilepsy).  
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 Furthermore, instead of using the three previous descriptors to characterize ASD 
(social interaction, communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviors/interests), the 
DSM-5 classification has collapsed the social interaction, and communication 
components into one category.  The justification for merging these two components is 
that there is great overlap between social interaction and communication (and merging 
eliminates redundancy).  Therefore, only two descriptors will serve as measures for 
diagnosis: social-communication, and fixation/repetitive behaviors.  According to the 
current criteria, a solid diagnosis of ASD must include symptoms of all three of the 
following components listed within the social-communication category: failure of social 
reciprocity (e.g. flat affect, lack of joint attention, failure to initiate and maintain 
conversation, failure to share interests with others), difficulties with nonverbal 
communication (e.g. unusual body posturing, repetitive usage of stereotyped or eccentric 
language, lack of coordination of eye contact with appropriate gestures), and problems 
maintaining peer relationships (e.g. lack of social or emotional exchange, lack of theory 
of mind, prefers to engage in solitary play, lack of spontaneous, imaginative play).  In 
addition, the diagnosis must satisfy two of three components listed in the 
restricted/repetitive behavior (RRB) category: repetitive behavior (gestural or verbal), 
engagement in rituals, and preoccupation of interests.  Restricted and repetitive 
behaviors, the focus of this paper, are evidenced by fascination with narrow or restrictive 
interests, repeated movements, engagement in non-purposive routines, repetitive motor 
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behaviors (e.g. rocking back and forth, hand flapping, spinning body in circles), and 
fascination with parts of objects (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
 Researchers have found that what accounts for the variability in cognitive 
functioning within the autism spectrum is the severity of the particular symptoms in the 
restricted and repetitive behavior (RRB) domain (Kim & Lord, 2010; Georgiades, 
Szatmari, Zwaigenbaum, et al., 2007).  It is important to note that RRBs are not exclusive 
to ASD: children with other intellectual disabilities and typically developing children also 
demonstrate repetitive behaviors (Leekam, Prior & Uljarevic, 2011).  However, the 
significant prevalence of RRBs in children with ASD as compared to other diagnostic 
groups is why it is considered as a defining characteristic of the autism spectrum 
disorders.  Furthermore, children with both autism subtypes exhibit a remarkable amount 
of RRBs compared to typically developing children (Honey, et al., 2007; Kim & Lord, 
2010; Werner & Dawson, 2005) and children with non-spectrum disorders (Goldman, et 
al., 2009; Kim & Lord, 2010).   
   Although RRBs are found in typically developing children in the first year of 
life, repetitive arm movements tend to increase after the first year.  Repetitive arm and 
hand movements seem to be correlated to vocal production and other motor movements 
(Iverson & Wozniak, 2007), but these movements decline over time as language and 
motor skills are coordinated and motor movement becomes purposive.  Based on an 
exhaustive review of the literature on restricted and repetitive behaviors in ASD, Leekam 
and colleagues outlined developmental patterns based on research that have used various 
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methods of measurement: parental interviews and questionnaires (i.e. ADI-R, Repetitive 
Behavior Scale, Childhood Routines Inventory, Repetitive Behavior Questionnaire) and 
observation tools (e.g. ADOS-G). Their review illustrates the limited longitudinal data 
investigating the developmental trajectory of RRBs in children with ASD.  The only 
research assessing RRBs by investigating repetitive motor behaviors and insistence of 
sameness in ASD was conducted by Richler, Huerta, Bishop, & Lord (2010).  Although 
repetitive motor behaviors remained very high over time (ages 2, 3, 5 and 9), this trend 
decreased with children with high nonverbal IQs at age 9.  The frequency of sensorimotor 
RRBs tends to be highly correlated in children with low-functioning ASD.  As children 
with ASD age, insistence on sameness behaviors also increases. Regarding IQ, children 
with high nonverbal scores tend to display fewer sensorimotor repetitive behaviors but 
more instances of narrow interests and perseveration of sameness.   
 There are many theories about the cause of RRBs, one of which is executive 
dysfunction. Executive functions are high-order cognitive abilities that enable individuals 
to inhibit inappropriate behavior, engage in planning and goal-directed behavior, and 
respond to feedback from the environment, which is important for flexibility and 
adapting to change (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou & Chen, 2008; Lezak, 2004).  Individuals 
with frontal lobe damage have impairments in these areas, and such executive 
dysfunction has been characterized in individuals with ASD (Leekam, Prior & Uljarevic, 
2011).  Executive dysfunction expressed through restricted routines and rituals has also 
been associated with symptoms related to Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD).  
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However, Leekam and colleagues note that while obsessive rituals are common in both 
disorders, those diagnosed with OCD seem to be distressed and tormented by these 
symptoms, whereas those diagnosed with ASD may find them to be stimulating. 
 Because the presence of restricted and repetitive behaviors (RRBs) increased the 
validity of an autism diagnosis in the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-
G), it was reinstated as a diagnostic marker (Kim & Lord, 2010).  Research has shown 
that there is some variability within the RRBs category (Leekam, Uljarevic & Prior, 
2011).  According to Cuccaro and colleagues (2003), longitudinal data from the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview—Revised (ADI-R) revealed two subtypes of RRB: a) repetitive 
sensory motor behaviors (repetitive mannerisms, repetitive use of objects, eccentric 
sensory fascinations); and b) insistence on sameness (engaging in routines and rituals, 
and difficulties with change in routine).  The latter subtype, perseveration for sameness, 
or cognitive inflexibility, is the characteristic of ASD that this paper will heavily focus on 
in the context of everyday event representation.  
I.3 Perseveration of Sameness Symptomology 
 Children with an ASD have a tendency to desire sameness, consistency, and 
completeness in a world that is dynamic and unpredictable.  This rigid cognitive style is 
resistant to adapting to change or spontaneity (Loth, Gomez & Happe, 2011).  A classic 
behavior of autism is lining up objects in a particular order or arrangement, and tantrums 
may occur if someone or something disrupts that order.  Kanner’s (1943) example of a 
child who was extremely anxious when his family was moving to a new home is similar 
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to many experiences that autistic children encounter presently.  The sheer panic of the 
movers removing his bedroom rug, furniture, and knickknacks that had been accumulated 
and arranged in a highly specific, yet nondescript pattern was placated as soon as the 
child finished reorganizing all of his belongings in the same pattern in his new room.  
The rug, each piece of furniture, and each bead and block had to be oriented precisely as 
it had been—in the same pattern and whose importance for this arrangement was only 
comprehensible to the child and no one else.  Noticing a misplaced block or bead was 
promptly followed by a tantrum until “order” was restored.  Kanner also noted that this 
uncanny ability for remembering specific details, exact amounts and the precise 
orientation of objects suggests that children with ASD have superior rote memory, one of 
the “cognitive potential” abilities of autism.   
 Proclivity for sameness is also evident in social exchanges in children with ASD.  
Although children with Asperger syndrome and high functioning autism do not have 
challenges with many fundamental features of language (e.g. phonology, morphology, 
grammar), pragmatics may present a challenge.  Pragmatics is the feature of language 
that pertains to its social uses: understanding context of an utterance even when it is not 
explicitly stated and how utterances contribute to their meaning; appropriate intonation, 
knowledge about and intent of the speaker; identifying ambiguous messages and acting to 
clarify, etc.  Considered the sophisticated and difficult aspect of linguistic knowledge, 
pragmatics is only acquired through experience (Fletcher, Happe, Frith, Baker, et al. 
1995).  The Gricean (1975) principle of cooperation, which includes specific 
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conversational maxims, emerged from pragmatic understanding and use in natural 
language.  Grice argues that in everyday discourse, there are common assumptions that 
language users (both speakers and listeners) make for effective conversation in everyday 
social situations.  Furthermore, those who abide by the cooperative principle and its 
maxims are ensuring that what they provide in the conversation will contribute to (and 
not hinder) its purpose.   
 Pragmatic and conversational breakdown in children with ASD greatly 
contributes to the language impairment characteristic of this disorder since perspective 
taking and understanding nonverbal communication are also challenges they face.  Rating 
scales used to assess pragmatic challenges have analyzed speech in children with autism 
based on Gricean theory (Ghaziuddin & Gerstein, 1996) and have found that children 
with ASDs primarily violate aspects of this linguistic feature.  In particular, their speech 
tends to have a robotic or formal intonation, delayed response, and they rarely initiate or 
maintaining conversations; they also tend to disengage from the conversation itself and 
abruptly switch topics (de Villiers, Fine, Ginsberg, Vaccarella & Szatmari, 2007).  When 
they do engage in longer social exchanges, perseveration frequently occurs, where 
conversations specifically revolve around special interests.  For instance, an ASD child, 
whose special interest is baseball may only discuss baseball in any conversation, and will 
do so in a pedantic fashion (e.g., reciting accurate information regarding statistics of 
teams and players, World Series winners, or games attended).  The autistic child, who 
deviated from the initial topic, also will provide no segue or pause for entry to enable the 
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listener to contribute.  The child with autism, breaching Gricean principles of 
cooperation, will more than likely fail to acknowledge nonverbal cues of the listener (i.e. 
diminished interest, attempted interruptions).  The listener, having neither limited 
knowledge of baseball, nor interest to switch to this new topic, will fail to reciprocate, 
causing the conversation to become one-sided.  In fact, research suggests that children 
with high functioning autism have challenges using strategies to process social 
information effectively. They have problems inhibiting irrelevant responses, adjusting 
their behavior based on environmental feedback, extracting rules from experience, and 
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information (Klin & Volkmar, 2000).  
 This insistence of sameness also extends to how individuals with ASD perceive 
common everyday events.  Not only do children with ASD expect that the world 
functions in a predictable, consistent fashion, but they also expect that others will 
conform to their rigid routines and rituals. Any slight deviation that seems to violate their 
assumption about the world is enough to induce heightened anxiety.  It is important to 
note that typically developing individuals also experience some level of anxiety when 
encountering a change in daily routine without preparation time.  After all, we may 
experience some level of distress if one day, on our commute to work, our usual train is 
delayed by 30 minutes.  Likewise, many students experience anxiety when a teacher 
announces a surprise quiz at the start of class.  However, our assumptions about the world 
are different from those with autism—we know, for instance, that the world is 
unpredictable and that adapting to change in our external environment is essential for 
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survival.  When faced with change in our everyday lives, spontaneity permits us to think 
of alternative options to solve a problem in order to move forward.  Conversely, many 
children with autism engage in rituals, in which events and actions that occur in events 
must happen in the same exact way every time.  Furthermore, individuals with autism 
insists that their routine is the only option to proceed; thus, anxiety and distress persists 
until the event is completed as precisely as possible.  This cognitive inflexibility, which 
does not allow for variability within every day events, is a characteristic of autism that 
makes it a challenging disorder to treat. 
I.4 Event Representation: Introduction 
 Event representation (also called event schemas, event knowledge, or scripts) is 
defined as memory for generalized predictions for what usually happens in familiar 
events (Mandler, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977).  Knowledge about events becomes 
activated for a present situation (Abelson, 1981), which includes the actors, objects, 
routine actions and social norms in an event (Schank & Abelson, 1977).  For instance, a 
doctor’s visit typically includes the doctor and patient (actors), scale, needles and 
stethoscope (objects), the doctor listening to patient’s heart beat (routine actions), and the 
patient remaining in the waiting room before being called by the doctor (social norms).   
Event representation categorizes information and activities from our past experiences into 
schemas that are used to guide inferences about novel situations and organizes activities 
within events in a hierarchical fashion (Luciarello & Nelson, 1985).  Activities associated 
with an event are referred to as scenes.  For instance, scenes in the “supermarket schema” 
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include: entering, getting items, paying, and leaving.  Activities associated with each 
scene are called slots (i.e. getting food).  Depending on frequency effects, some slots 
become central components to the event (paying bill), or are specific to an event (i.e. 
decorating tree at Christmas time).  Other slots are considered optional because they are 
not specifically related to the event (saying “hi” to a neighbor).  Furthermore, slots 
include a variety of slot fillers, which are specific activities or objects related to the slot 
(e.g. getting bread, getting non-fat yogurt).  Events that we experience in real life consist 
of predictable sets of actions performed in a particular order, which are subject to some 
degree of variability (Loth, Gomez & Happe, 2011).  
Although some research has investigated how infants and young children are able 
to access what they knew about everyday events and apply this knowledge to new 
situations, our current knowledge is limited (e.g., Bauer & Dow, 1994; McDonough & 
Mandler, 1998).  As we collect data on the processes that guide generalizations in 
typically developing children, it becomes increasingly important to understand the extent 
to which these processes are also available in children with developmental disorders.  
After all, if we are to design training programs that will be beneficial to those with 
various learning disorders, we need to know whether those who undergo the interventions 
will be able to apply what they have learned.  Construction of event representation 
requires two essential cognitive processes: generalization ability and awareness of 
temporal sequential ordering of actions within the event (Loth, Happe & Gomez, 2010).  
These processes allow us to represent events in the face of potential variation.  In order to 
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understand how these processes work together in the context of everyday event 
representation, we must first review the literature on categorization, or the source of 
classifying familiar knowledge.  Because research suggests that children with ASD have 
difficulties with categorization (Church, Krauss, Lopata & Toomey, 2010; Klinger & 
Dawson, 1995), this deficit could impede their ability to generalize to novel situations.    
I.5 Category Development: Early Foundations for Generalization Skills 
Event representation involves information about the objects and actions that are 
associated with objects within events.  Young children quickly learn about the function of 
objects and props that are associated with routines that they experience on a daily basis.   
Although shopping carts and baskets are containers for transporting food while in a 
supermarket, young children come to realize that a shopping cart is larger than a basket, 
moves when someone pushes it, and serves a dual purpose as a “wagon.”  As with 
activities within a specific event schema (e.g., bath time), objects used for causal and 
conventional actions are essential (i.e. soap and towel), whereas arbitrary props are not 
(i.e. rubber duck).  How is it that young children come to make meaning of the functions 
of many objects?  Do children with ASD and children with cognitive and language delays 
comprehend objects in the same way?  In order to understand how children determine 
meaning, we must define the term “concept”.  A concept is the product of an analytic 
process and refers to a unit of meaning that is an interpretation of a percept (Mandler, 
2000).  Our perceptual systems can identify what a “cup” looks like, however this is 
qualitatively different from knowledge that a cup is a container used for drinking. Thus, 
	   28 
concepts are not based on what something merely looks like; rather, concepts are a 
representation of what something really is, what it does, or what is done to it.  A percept 
is implicit in that it typically uses automatic, unconscious processing for perceptual 
identification.  Percepts can be very detailed, context-dependent and used to make 
distinctions based on physical appearance.  A concept, by definition, is explicit and, as 
such, is consciously accessible for higher-order functions such as memory, problem 
solving and generalization.  Concepts, general and independent of context, are used for 
determining kinds and functions (Mandler, 2000).   
Categorization, an early cognitive skill, is one of the most fundamental schemas 
used by humans.  Conceptual categories facilitate the identification and organization of 
objects independent of their perceptual orientation (Bornstein & Mash, 2010), and 
include the act of distributing things into classes or categories of the same type.  
Conceptually based categories are essential in efficiently clarifying, systematizing, and 
banking information—a necessary cognitive tool for making predictions about unfamiliar 
stimuli.  Categorization involves the representation of similar entities into classes.  
However, it is important to note that when the expressions “similar” or “similarity” are 
used to describe the relations between objects, these terms must be qualified (Medin, 
Goldstone & Gentner, 1993).  In what respect are objects within categories similar? For 
instance, dogs, cats, horses, lions and elephants are some good examples of the category 
ANIMAL, however, chair, motorcycle, bag and pencil are not. Additionally, the metric 
that one uses to include examples near the boundary or periphery of a category and define 
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the exclusion of others is also important. For example, would a preverbal infant consider 
a jellyfish to be an ANIMAL?  What is the basis for forming this category?  There has 
been much debate regarding how preverbal infants form categories given the limited 
exposure they have with objects and events. Do they form categories by generating an 
amalgamation of all of the physical attributes (i.e. color, shape, size) of objects associated 
with them, allowing categorization based on overall shape similarity?  Or does 
conceptual thinking guide categorization? Perhaps children engage in multiple processes 
in an effort to classify information. 
One of the first avenues of research with typically developing infants and children 
that should illuminate generalization processes concerns how they learn to categorize 
objects.  Traditional views propose that children observe the similarities among objects 
and based on these observations assume that things that look similar are the same kind of 
thing.  So, even though a Siamese cat may differ somewhat from a Persian cat, both tend 
to share overall shape and belong to the same category.  Thus, when one observes a 
Siamese cat engaging in a particular behavior, one might generalize that observation by 
assuming that Persian cats engage in the same behavior.  Research supporting the view 
that infants treat similarly shaped objects as belonging to the same category comes from 
two sources: infant habituation studies and language studies. Quinn and Eimas (1994) 
used a habituation measure and showed that infants as young as 3-months of age can 
categorize several different cats and recognize that cats perceptually differ from tigers, 
dogs, horses, and birds but resemble female lions.  At this age, however, it is assumed 
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that infants know little about what kind of thing a cat is (e.g., cats are a kind of animal, 
they purr, meow and like milk).   
The similarity hypothesis was embraced by several developmental psychologists 
and was also commonly used as an explanation and predictor of adult categorization 
skills (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Broyes-Braem, 1976; Sloutsky & Fisher, 
2003; Tversky, 1977).  According to Tversky (1977), similarity judgments between two 
entities are largely dependent on the analysis and weighting of perceptual features such as 
color, shape, size, and texture.  Whether a novel stimulus will be included or not as a 
category member depends largely on whether the physical properties common to 
category members are also evident in the novel stimulus.  Sloutsky and Fisher (2003) 
elaborated on this argument by proposing that the process of judging matches and 
mismatches of stimuli will change similarity judgments as a function of the variability of 
the perceptual features.  They predicted that high variability among category members 
decreases the likelihood that a novel item will be included in the category.  The various 
experiments by Rosch and her colleagues (1976) convinced many that similarity was a 
useful heuristic both for children and adults for category formation, particularly for 
“basic-level” categories.  
The similarity view of categorization, which is often used to explain how people 
generalize what they know to new situations, was not without controversy.  Research on 
categorization with amnesic adults showed that they could make categorical distinctions 
based on perceptual information (arrays of dots) through prototype formation (Squire & 
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Knowlton, 1995), even though they had limited awareness of such categories.  The 
formation of categories with which we have no awareness is presumably not useful when 
problem solving or making predictions about future events.  The procedure used in the 
research with amnesic adults was similar to that used with young infants.  This compelled 
some researchers to interpret the infant data conservatively—perhaps, just like amnesic 
adults; infants were forming categories of cats and dogs based on perceptual processes.  
Given the inaccessibility of such categories to conscious processes, it was deemed 
unlikely that these categories would provide a foundation to guide reasoning.  
In an effort to uncover category formation that is based on what infants know 
about objects in the world rather than simply what objects look like, Mandler, Bauer, and 
McDonough (1991) examined infant categorization of perceptually varied objects, which 
would not be considered similar by any theory at the time.  They tested categorization of 
animals and vehicles using tasks that were more interactive than those used by other 
researchers.  Results indicated that 18-month-olds were quite good at differentiating 
animals and vehicles, yet these same infants had difficulties categorizing dogs and 
rabbits, categories that were perceptually distinguished by 3-month-olds (Eimas & 
Boutelle, 1995). This finding was in sharp contrast to what was predicted based 
knowledge of similarity at the time of this study.  
Mandler and McDonough (1998) extended these findings with infants as young as 
7 months of age and found they could categorize animals, vehicles, plants, and furniture 
items but not basic level categories such as dogs, rabbits, cats, fish. Before they could 
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interpret the data, they further evaluated their findings in two ways. First, they reasoned 
that similarity judgments might not be the same for infants as for older children and 
adults.  They took photos of their stimuli and turned them over the Peter Eimas, an expert 
at testing infant perceptual categorization using habituation and preferential looking 
measures.  Using the slides, he and his student Jonathan Boutelle (1995) found that 3-
month-olds did not distinguish the animals and vehicles but did categorize the dogs and 
cats.  This suggested a dissociation between the measures that corresponded to the bases 
on which the categories were formed: habituation and looking time measures revealed 
perceptual categories whereas object examination, sequential touching, and match-to-
sample measures suggested conceptual bases on which categories could be formed.   
Mandler (2000) postulated that these findings suggest that young infants use two 
kinds of processes to classify objects: perceptual and conceptual categorization.  These 
types of categorization strategies can process a stimulus in qualitatively different ways.  
Specifically, perceptual categorization is used to recognize what an object is, or looks 
like, based on perceptual properties (i.e. overall shape, color, texture).  Even prototype 
formations of perceptual categories do not require a concept, since the development of 
prototypes derives from physical features.  A prototype emerges from the average of 
salient features from many perceptually similar exemplars.  Furthermore, prototype 
formation can be achieved without conscious analysis or intent (Mandler, 2000).  
Perceptual categorization is often an automatic, implicit process in which the information 
is not consciously accessible and does not require representation or produce meaning.  
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For example, knowing what a cat looks like based on physical appearance and overall 
shape will serve as a foundation (prototype) for identifying other cat shapes, but one may 
still not know what a cat is unless it is also conceptualized.   
Conceptual categorization identifies an object in terms of what kind of thing the 
object is, what it does, or what is done to it or with it.  It is an explicit process that is the 
interpretation of perception, requiring the abstraction of meaning about an object.  
Individual parts or physical features of objects do not provide this information.  Indeed, 
similarity is a metric that we use as a basis to organize varying types of information, and 
the extent to which A is similar to B depends on the degree to which they share features 
in common (either directional or bidirectional) (Tversky, 1977).  However, to make a 
comparison among entities, one must first qualify which function of similarity will be 
used to make a judgment.  The processing system one decides to utilize in making 
judgments of similarity could yield different results (Medin, Goldstone & Gentner, 1993).  
For example, asking someone to rate whether a golf ball is similar to a whole egg will 
need more clarification (McDonough, unpublished data) because a golf ball looks 
something like a whole egg—these objects have a high degree of perceptual similarity if 
one is looking at overall shape and if both are white.  If one focuses on textures, however, 
these objects are dissimilar.  Conversely, if one is thinking about similarity in a 
conceptual fashion, a whole egg is nothing like a golf ball, and therefore, would be rated 
low in terms of conceptual similarity.  An egg we may cook for breakfast while a golf 
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ball we may hit to guide its entry into a hole. In a real-world context, that the two objects 
look similar is not meaningful if they do not operate in the same way.  
It is important to note that categorization processes are not limited to objects.  
There is clear evidence that language has an influence on category formation.  For 
instance, English and Korean languages categorize spatial relations in different ways.  
Particularly, the English language consists of spatial terms that make distinctions between 
containment (in) and physical contact and support (on).  The Korean language, however, 
makes sensitive distinctions of containment describing “tight fit” (kkita) and “loose” 
(nehta) (McDonough, Choi & Mandler, 2003). Kkita describes “a tight fit,” which 
overlaps the two English meanings for in and on.  For example, the word kkita 
encompasses “putting a piece in a puzzle” and “putting a ring on finger.”  However, 
nehta is the equivalent Korean word for the concept of the English word that describes 
“loosely inside other objects” (Choi, McDonough, Bowerman & Mandler, 1999).  
Research by McDonough and colleagues (2003) has illustrated that language can play a 
role in category formation by selecting particular features in spatial properties and 
labeling them. Using a preferential looking task, the findings revealed that although 
infants were able to categorize spatial understanding in either language regardless of the 
language they were beginning to acquire, adults tend to be successful at comprehending 
the spatial concepts specific to their primary language without being aware of those 
specific to other languages.  Thus, categorization of spatial relations becomes influenced 
by language acquisition by around 24-months of age (Choi & McDonough, 2007). 
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Because the real world is dynamic, behaviors of and actions performed on objects 
are considered to a greater degree than perceptual details in an effort to establish 
meaning.  As a result, superordinate categories that emerge in the first year of life (i.e. 
animate vs. inanimate) are based on inchoate principles of physics (i.e. causality), the 
function of objects, and bodily movements (i.e. drinking or sleeping) (Mandler, 1992; 
McDonough & Mandler, 1998).  Furthermore, research indicates that young infants form 
animate vs. inanimate distinctions based on motion (i.e. jumping or walking) and sensory 
abilities (i.e. looking or listening), and they can also discriminate within the animate 
superordinate category—distinguishing between animals and people based on these 
conceptual properties  (Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, & Johnson, 2006). 
How does category formation become useful in everyday life?  How do we come 
to represent events as we experience them daily, while adjusting to slight differences that 
occur in routines?  To answer questions regarding the applicability of our concepts, we 
need to address the process of generalization.  Generalization, one of the hallmarks of 
human cognition, is a tool that helps guide decision-making about new experiences based 
on previous experience and is a mechanism that facilitates problem solving, analogous 
transfer, tool use, and creativity.  For generalization to occur, the stimulus presented must 
differ perceptually but retains some conceptual or representational similarity to an 
existing category in the knowledge base.  The presentation of an unfamiliar stimulus 
requires some cognitive reflection in search for a category that would account for it. 
Next, abstraction of relevant information from the category is applied to make meaning 
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of the unfamiliar stimulus.  By this description the process facilitating generalization is 
explicit.  Generalization eventually results in accommodation—not only interpreting the 
stimulus and incorporating it in the category, but also modifying the category to a more 
rich and complex form.  This enriched category will be helpful in generalizing future 
stimuli with lower degrees of perceptual variability that share a high degree of conceptual 
similarity.  Future encounters of more discrepant stimuli may also be accommodated, 
resulting in further categorical enrichment. This illustrates the dynamic bidirectional 
relationship between categorization and generalization.  Thus, the abstraction of 
categorized information and applying this knowledge in the presence of an unfamiliar 
situation is crucial for predictability, adaptability, and survival. 
I.6 Early Generalized Knowledge Based on Object Function 
McDonough and Mandler (1998) developed a measure of categorization that taps 
into the inferences or generalizations that infants make about the properties to 
conceptualize animals and vehicles.  Their results indicated that around the age of 9-11 
months, infants demonstrate knowledge that animals engage in drinking and sleeping 
actions (even animals they had not seen before) and vehicles are associated with keying, 
and they give rides to people (even novel vehicles).  Further investigations to uncover 
what infants would understand about basic-level categories indicated that properties 
specific to dogs or to birds were not understood before 18- to 24-months of age.  In terms 
of the concepts that guide categories as broad as animals and vehicles, infants seem to 
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know some of them much earlier than the concepts that are more restrictive (such as 
dogs), which are not learned until considerably later.   
Researchers working with slightly older children focused on how children use the 
function of objects to guide categorization.  They posited that form and function are 
highly correlated—thus arguments that characterize categorization processes as either 
perceptually or conceptually based are misleading (e.g., Medin & Ortony, 1989). After 
all, when people explore objects, they are usually interacting with object parts that are 
functional (Madole & Cohen, 1995; Tversky, 1989). Moreover, it is the function of an 
object that provides an understanding of what kind of object something is.  Such 
understanding is crucial for problem solving and generalization. Using a slightly different 
argument, one might posit that infants learn that things with mouths drink while things 
with eyes sleep. However, infants tend not to give drinks to “flying tiger airplanes” that 
have prominent mouths and they also tend to put an animal into a bed even if the eyes are 
not visible (Mandler, 2000).  Booth and Waxman (Booth, 2006; Booth & Waxman, 2002) 
posited that infants’ natural attraction to people might be associated with the salience of 
the function of objects (since they observe older children and adults manipulate objects). 
Such observations of the actions of others, coupled with one’s own actions, may give rise 
to cognitive concepts such as intentionality, causality, goals of agents and problem 
solving.  Additionally, children first label objects the same way adults do through their 
social interactions. In addition, adults are primary facilitators in helping to hone event 
memory in young children (Nelson, 2007). 
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In research with 10-, 14- and 18-month old infants, Madole, Oakes and Cohen 
(1993) found support for the idea that infants recognize form-function correlations that 
could potentially guide their categorization of objects.  They familiarized infants with 
two objects with form and function correlations.  The infants were subsequently 
presented with three test stimuli: a toy with an intact form-function relation; a toy that 
violated the form-function relation in that it had the same form but the function was not 
working; and a novel toy.  Results showed no significant change in infants’ amount of 
attention to the test objects that embodied identical form-function correlations.  However, 
when shown a test object that was similar in form but violated this correlation, infants’ 
attention increased indicating that they recognized the violation.  As expected, infants 
attended even longer to the novel toy that differed in both form and function. Their 
recognition of the two changes was indicated by longer examination of the novel toy than 
to the toy where only one functional change was evident.  
Other research has shown that preverbal infants will readily ignore global 
perceptual features of objects when a violation of function is detected.  For example, 
Kolstad and Baillargeon (1990; reported in Kemler Nelson et al., 2000) familiarized 
infants with a container and demonstrated the containment property by pouring sand into 
it.  Infants were then shown a dissimilar container that functioned in the same way and 
their looking time did not increase (indicating that they thought it was a container just 
like the previous object). They were then shown a similar container that violated the 
function by appearing to have no bottom, yet still functioned by holding sand.  Infants 
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increased their attention to this object, presumably because they had selectively attended 
to the critical part and were surprised when this bottomless cup actually held sand.   
When one examines language acquisition, a similar finding is evident. Research 
with older children shows that function is the basis on which nouns are extended.  Deák, 
Ray and Pick (2002) showed children three objects: a) a hybrid object that appeared like 
it was one kind of thing but functioned as if it were another (e.g., a football shaped 
telephone); b) an object perceptually similar to the hybrid but did not function in the 
same way (a football); and c) an object that was functionally the same as the hybrid but 
differed perceptually (a telephone with a typical shape and appearance).  Only the hybrid 
object was labeled (e.g., “see, this is a fep”) and then children were asked to choose from 
two other objects the one with the same label (“show me the other fep”).  Results 
indicated that children ignored the global appearances of the objects and extended the 
label based on functional information.   
Using a more systematic approach, Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke and Jones 
(2000) manipulated similarity and function using four objects, all of which appeared to 
have the same function.  Only two of the objects, however, were functional and these two 
objects were not similar to each other.  The other two objects had the same perceptual 
qualities of the first two, but did not share the same function.  This experiment explicitly 
sought to test the interaction between similarity and function by investigating whether 
children would be able to identify and name functional objects with varied perceptual 
appearances.  Although participants were two years of age, and thus much younger than 
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those tested by Deák and colleagues (2002), results were similar in that the children 
considered function when the relationship between form and function was 
comprehensible to them.  Labels were extended based on function but not on form alone. 
The authors concluded that children learn language, and use it in a meaningful 
way, under the following conditions: a) the structure that enables function is noticeable 
and well-defined; b) the design of the structure that enables function is easily 
comprehended; c) the relationship between structure and function is causally related; and 
d) the relationship is convincing in that the critical functional part is understood in terms 
of how it enables the function of the object.  Under these circumstances, children’s 
information processing of function can operate in a meaningful way, and providing them 
with an understanding of how language and categorization of objects is extended and 
generalized.  These results and conclusions are developmentally consistent with how both 
children and adults regard function in a mindful, meaningful fashion.  Generalizing 
according to function is a meaningful process because functions are dependent on the 
relations among parts of objects rather than the parts themselves.  Consistent with 
research by McDonough and colleagues in infants as young as 9-months, research by 
Kemler Nelson and colleagues demonstrated that perceptual similarity becomes 
undermined by relational similarity, especially under the conditions where causal 
relations of actions give clues about the function of an object.   
I.7 Object Function within Everyday Events, and the Importance of  
Sequential Understanding 
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Conceptual categorization and generalization also involves understanding the 
functions and relations of objects within events (Mandler, 2000).  This process requires 
higher order abstract cognitive thinking such as intentionality and perspective taking.  
Due to their attraction to movement, when infants observe adults interacting with an 
object (e.g., pouring milk into a bottle), the actions associated with the objects help 
infants form abstract representations about the functions of the object itself (container for 
holding liquid), those that slightly differ perceptually (e.g., cup, jar), and the role that the 
object plays within the context of events (feeding time).  
Everyday event representation refers to the utilization of memory processes 
responsible for adjusting to day-to-day life (Jones, Happe, Pickles, et al., 2011).  This 
kind of memory is especially functional because it allows us to make predictions about 
future events, which may initially be perceived as unfamiliar due to superficial 
differences in details and context. Recurring episodes of a particular event helps to form a 
salient representation, or schema for that event.  Generalization serves as a mechanism 
that facilitates event representation by providing an understanding of actions and 
correctly ordered sequences that typically occur in an event. 
The research discussed so far has focused on how infants and young children 
categorize and label objects in laboratory settings.  In real world settings, however, 
infants learn about objects through their understanding of everyday events. Routines such 
as getting dressed in the morning, having breakfast, bathing, going to the grocery store, 
and hearing a bedtime story, occur on a regular basis.  Infants learn these routines early in 
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life and can use them to form expectations about novel events (eating dinner at grandma’s 
house or taking a bath with cousins).  Their memory for everyday events includes actors, 
objects, and actions that are customarily seen in these events, allow children to categorize 
them as “slot fillers”(Abelson, 1981; Luciarello & Nelson, 1985; Schank & Abelson, 
1977).  For example, one can form a category of food and dishes by observing the items 
that accompany mealtimes.  A category of food can also be surmised from experiences at 
the grocery store. Bath time is not complete without water, soap, a towel, and perhaps a 
few bath toys.  Most three-year-olds can tell you what happens when they go to 
McDonald’s or other restaurants. 
  Representations about a particular kind of event can happen after a single 
occasion, which are instances of episodic memory—memory for singular events.  For 
example, in her analysis of the narratives of pre-school and kindergarten children, Fivush 
(1984) found that on the second day of school, children can accurately report in the 
correct temporal order what will occur without any intrusions of what had happened 
during school the previous year.  This is evidence for intact event representation because 
each year there are both similarities and differences in classes and other activities.  Slot 
fillers are variable and can change over many episodes.  Therefore, generalization ability 
requires the awareness that variability is expected for an event or experience.    
Generalized expectations of what one would anticipate in a familiar situation is an 
important cognitive tool that also provides information about associated activities and the 
temporal order in which they occur (Schank & Abelson, 1977).  The sequential ordering 
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of activities associated with an event is crucial and helps to determine the course of 
action to take if the event is encountered in the future (Bauer & Dow, 1994). For 
example, the order of the event schema for “shopping at the supermarket” normally 
includes: entering, picking up a shopping cart, seating child in the cart (if child is young), 
wheeling the cart up and down aisles, selecting food items and placing them in the cart, 
putting items on counter at cashier, cashier tabulating a bill, paying the bill, waiting for 
items to be packed into bags, putting bags into the cart, and leaving the store.  Actions 
that comprise everyday events are either linked by causal or enabling relations (e.g., 
opening a door before entering, using soap to remove dirt) or are ordered by social 
conventions due to frequency effects (e.g. leaving a tip).  Optional, or arbitrary actions 
may not contribute to the completion of a particular event (e.g., buying milk). Through 
recurring events, preverbal children are able to form representations despite the 
variability encountered within episodes. 
Everyday events are consistent not only in terms of the kinds of objects that are 
used but also with respect to the order in which activities that comprise an event are 
carried out (Loth, Happe & Gomez, 2010).  Some orders are conventional for certain 
cultures (e.g., eating salad either before or after the main course).  There is no apparent 
reason for why one order is preferred over another, it is just generally agreed that this will 
be the order followed based on what most people do in a given culture.  Children learn 
that cereal or pancakes are good breakfast items, whereas meatloaf, even though it is a 
food item, may seem unusual as a breakfast food.  Children also may learn to put on their 
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pajamas before a nighttime story is read.  Ordering activities in this way is governed only 
by conventional agreement; the order could differ but typically does not.   
Other activities are causally ordered or ordered such that one step enables the next 
one to be carried out. Orders are often governed to meet a particular goal.  One boils the 
water, cooks the spaghetti, drains the spaghetti, and adds the sauce before serving it for 
dinner.  Even though a child will not engage in cooking, by observing an adult, the child 
will presumably learn the order in which tasks occur.  As adults, we understand the 
causal connection between the steps when making spaghetti.  A child-appropriate activity 
would be making a rattle.  One places a small object in a container, puts a lid on the 
container, and then shakes it to make a rattle sound.  Using a different order either will 
not work (one must place the small object in the container before putting on the lid) or 
will not provide the same interesting result (shaking an empty container would not make 
noise).  As illuminated in this example, some activities are “enabling” in terms of the 
order in which they can be carried out.  As in another example, one needs to open a milk 
carton before pouring out the milk and drinking it.  Therefore, an enabling order is one 
for which it is physically impossible to do the activity in the opposite order.  If the cap 
stays on the milk, the milk stays in the carton. Both causal and enabling orders are fixed. 
Sometimes activities are carried out in varied orders—the ordering is arbitrary 
and one can do one action before another or vice versa without consequence.  For 
example, a happy meal at McDonald’s not only has food but also a toy included with it.  
One can eat the hamburger or apple slices before playing with the toy or vice versa.  
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Alternatively, one can switch off from one to other until the food is finished and the toy 
becomes boring.  Notably, parents usually have specific order in mind when it comes to 
eating meals but a child eating at McDonald’s can challenge that order.   
I.8 Event Representation in Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
 To what extent can children with ASD spontaneously form a representation of 
everyday events?  Generalization of everyday events requires an understanding that 
variability within the context of the event is expected at many levels (Loth, Happe & 
Gomez 2010).  Frith (1989) describes typical cognition as a “built-in propensity to form 
coherence over as wide range of stimuli as possible, and to generalize over as wide a 
range of contexts as possible” (p. 159-160).  Central coherence, or the natural drive for 
cohesion and global meaning, is an important cognitive tool for making sense of the 
world.  This idea was influenced by the Gestalt movement of perceptual processing—the 
idea that part structures are determined after global analysis (Happe & Booth, 2008).  
Research by Navon (1977) using hierarchical visual arrays (e.g. H consisting of many 
S’s) has demonstrated that adults process global properties before local features.  The 
Gestalt movement was not limited to perceptual processing; theorists applied this concept 
to other cognitive abilities.  For example, Bartlett (1932) argued that regarding memory, 
adults tend to recall the “gist” rather than “verbatim,” and determine meaning at the 
expense of accuracy. 
The weak central coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Happe & Frith, 2006) has been 
used to describe why children with ASD may have challenges with generalizing events.  
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Individuals with ASD have a tendency to attend to and encode irrelevant details at the 
expense of attempting to understand meaning.  In fact, weak central coherence was 
empirically evidenced by proficient performance by ASD individuals compared to their 
typically developing counterparts on tests that require participants to locate simple 
features and parts within a larger complex whole.  The Children’s Embedded Figures 
Test and the Un/Segmented Block Design Test (Shah & Frith, 1993) are tasks that require 
a bottom-up approach to understand the whole design in terms of its parts. Performance 
on these tasks was better for individuals with ASD than typically developing children.  
However, on Gestalt-like tests assessing global integration (by asking participants to 
identify a picture from its constituent parts), individuals with ASD needed to be shown 
more frames of the parts to identify the picture, suggesting poorer integrative processing.  
Weak central coherence can limit how one represents everyday events if generalization 
and the expectation of variability is compromised.  According to Happe and Booth 
(2010), understanding the meaning of activities and their importance within an event is 
crucial for distinguishing between central slots from those that are optional.  
Additionally, local processing may hinder understanding everyday events by 
inadvertently categorizing slotfillers (lower-level components which probably occurred a 
few times) as central slots.  Therefore, slight variations in a particular event would be 
considered as discrete episodes, making it difficult for children with ASD to make sense 
of the world and adapt to variability.  
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 Research has also shown a trend of dissociation between performance and ability 
with regard to superior performance on various tasks in the lab setting versus profound 
challenges in naturalistic settings (McDonough, Stahmer, Shreibman & Thompson, 
1997).  One explanation for this finding is that not only do laboratory settings minimize 
distractions, but the experimenter also has preselected stimuli deemed relevant (Loth, 
Gomez & Happe, 2010).  On the other hand, naturalistic, real life situations require 
individuals to spontaneously sift through what is relevant among a mixture of relevant 
and irrelevant data. 
  Loth, Gomez & Happe (2010) investigated how high-functioning children with 
autism and typically developing children spontaneously process relevant features in 
scenes, which is important for event representation and understanding social norms.  The 
research was limited to boys to reflect the high prevalence rate of autism in boys. After 
participants read a story, they looked at a scene in which some of the objects were 
relevant, irrelevant, or neutral to the context.  Results revealed no difference in the 
number of overall items recalled between the two participant groups. However, there 
were differences in kind of items remembered; typically developing boys remembered 
significantly more relevant items than the high-functioning autism group.  These results 
suggest that typically developing boys had an understanding of context-relevant 
information for a particular episode.   
In the replication experiment, which investigated adults, results revealed that 
typically developing adults looked more often at irrelevant items than individuals in the 
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ASD group and recalled more context-relevant than irrelevant items. On the other hand, 
the ASD group looked more often at neutral items than both relevant and irrelevant items, 
but recalled as many neutral as relevant items and more neutral than irrelevant items. 
Loth and colleagues proposed that a reason for these findings in the typically developing 
group is that “unexpected items are more ‘attention grabbing’ than schema-consistent 
objects.”  Having a foundation for what is relevant can serve as a scaffold so that it is 
easier to identify abnormalities.  Overall, typically developing adults were able to select 
both important and unimportant aspects in an environment whereas ASD individuals 
could not.  Perhaps their limited event schemas could not help them to identify what did 
not belong in the scene.  Furthermore, their ability to attend to both neutral and relevant 
items in the story increased memory load.  It is useful and efficient to use relevant 
information as a basis for determining what is irrelevant, which is important for survival.  
Being able to determine what does not belong in an expeditious way is important for 
decision-making.  
I.9 Purpose of Dissertation and Research Hypotheses 
The current study is the first to comprehensively examine functional 
generalization and imitation as a function of action and correctly ordered sequence 
relations (causal, arbitrary or conventional) in children with mild- to high-functioning 
ASD, children with cognitive and language delays, and in typically developing children.  
In the elicited imitation method, the experimenter models 3- to 4-step test sequences with 
miniature objects, after which the child is given the opportunity to manipulate the same 
	   49 
objects the experimenter used to imitate the sequences. The order in which the actions are 
modeled is either causal (actions must be produced in a particular order to achieve a 
goal), arbitrary (actions can be produced in any order with the same resulting outcome), 
and for the familiar events, conventional (e.g., bedtime stories are typically read after the 
child is in bed).  The mean proportion of actions and correctly ordered sequences that the 
child imitates is assessed.   
The elicited imitation only assesses how much of a particular event is recalled.  
An appropriate methodology to examine generalization of the temporal order of 
sequences is the generalized imitation paradigm (Mandler & McDonough, 1996).  Many 
developmental studies with typically developing children (Bauer, 2002; Mandler & 
McDonough, 1996, 1998) have utilized the generalized imitation paradigm to investigate 
representational capacity and flexibility.  Like elicited imitation, the generalized imitation 
method also examines generalization of actions and correct temporal order of sequences; 
however, the major difference is a prop-change manipulation between assessment periods 
(Mandler & McDonough, 1996).  The procedure only requires the child to engage in 
physical actions with objects and does not require expressive verbal ability of the child, 
mitigating language issues.  Actions are modeled with miniature objects in a particular 
order sequence.  The child, however, is then given props that are perceptually different 
(in size, shape, texture, and/or color), but have the same function as the modeling objects, 
enabling the child to execute the actions of the same task.  Event sequences are 
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comprised of causal, arbitrary, and familiar action pairs. The mean proportion of actions 
and correctly ordered sequences to which the child generalizes are subject to analysis.  
Each task consisted of several props, in which interaction between props in the 
correct sequential order was necessary for completion of the task.  The stimuli that the 
children were presented with for generalization retained functional similarity, but were 
perceptually dissimilar for each test event compared to the modeling props.  The goal for 
the current study is to increase ecological validity by not systematically controlling for 
the artifact characteristics of shape, size, color, and texture.  Therefore, generalization 
props that paralleled modeling props variably differed in terms of perceptual similarity.  
This naturalistic approach is thought to reflect real world settings, which is especially 
important for children with ASD.  
A question of importance for the current project is whether differences in 
generalization of modeled causal, arbitrary and conventional actions, and correctly 
ordered sequences will be found depending on the kind of task (novel vs. familiar) in 
children with mild- to high-functioning ASD, children with mild- to high-cognitive and 
language delays, and typically developing children.  Additionally, language (assessed 
from IQ scores obtained from school reports or administration of receptive language test) 
was an ancillary topic of interest to determine whether language ability is correlated with 
generalization production. 
Typically Developing Children 
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Research on how typically developing infants and young children remember event 
sequences reveals that episodic memory and generalize event knowledge takes place 
from a very early age.  Overall, typically developing children can robustly imitate both 
novel and familiar actions and sequences (Bauer & Dow, 2004; Bauer & Fivush, 1992; 
Mandler & McDonough, 1996).  Because older children are proficient at imitating others, 
we will utilize the imitation assessment as a comparison by which to determine whether 
generalization is performed similarly or is more difficult for children at different 
cognitive levels.  This is because what is under investigation is the assessment of 
children’s transfer of knowledge, and not merely motor skills (or how precisely children 
are capable of copying behaviors).  Regarding imitation of types relations (causal, 
arbitrary, conventional), although typically developing children tend to recall higher 
proportions of causal actions and sequences than arbitrary actions and sequences in novel 
tasks (Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Dow, 1994; Bauer & Thal, 1990), we expect all children to 
perform all types at near ceiling levels.    
In the generalization literature, typically developing children around 14-20 
months of age learn an activity on one set of objects and can recall the activity after 
lengthy delays and after the activity is carried out on a different set of objects.  That is, 
they can distinguish the old objects when paired with new ones because they remember 
the original event and readily generalize it to another context and different objects (Bauer 
& Dow, 1994; Barnat, Klein & Meltzoff, 1996).  There have also been instances, 
however, in which actions and temporal orders governed by causal or enabling 
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connections are generalized less often than those with arbitrary orders in novel tasks.  
That is, actions and sequences that are arbitrarily ordered are readily generalized but 
those that are causally ordered are difficult for young children to generalize (Bauer & 
Dow, 2004).  Also, in 2-1/2 year olds, generalization substantially decreases in instances 
where one prop has changed in a causally related pair of actions compared to an arbitrary 
pair (Bauer & Fivush, 1992).  Additional research suggests that 16- and 20- month-old 
children show no differences in generalization of these types (Bauer & Dow, 1994).   
Because typically developing children have had much experience in variation of 
familiar sequences in everyday life, we expect successful performance of overall 
generalization and sequential ordering in all three groups.  Additionally, previous 
research has shown that what guides memory is script knowledge in familiar events and 
causal links in novel events (Mandler & McDonough, 1995).  However, based on 
inconsistent results in the prior research (Bauer & Dow, 1994; 2004), we take a non-
directional approach regarding any interaction between action and sequence types and 
assessment periods.  We also anticipate normal language ability from the typically 
developing children, and this control group will be used as a standard by which we 
compare the ASD and CLD groups. 
Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
Perseveration of sameness is an inherent characteristic in children with ASD, 
which could inhibit their ability to think flexibly by using what they were taught, and 
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generalizing, or applying what they have learned to different contexts.  Based on this 
premise, we expect that children with ASD will perform poorly on generalization tasks.  
To date, little to no research has investigated imitation and generalization in the 
context of everyday event representation in children with ASD, using the elicited and 
generalized imitation procedures in which children manipulate props.  Using other kinds 
of imitation assessments, children with ASD have demonstrated profound decrements in 
performance (Smith, & Bryson, 1994; Soorya, Arnstein, Gillis, & Romanczyk 2003; 
Vivanti, Nadig, Ozonoff, & Rogers, 2008; Young, Rogers, Hutman, Rozga, Sigman, & 
Ozonoff, 2011).  One theory (Ingersoll, 2008) suggests that social deficits associated with 
autism (i.e. joint attention, sharing interests, reciprocity) impede their ability to imitate, 
since imitation of another person’s behavior requires social engagement.  
Are there particular instances in which children with autism do imitate? Marsh, 
Pearson, Ropar & Hamilton (2013) have shown evidence that children with ASD produce 
actions in imitation tasks, though they would not copy another’s behavior under 
particular circumstances.  Specifically, children with ASD will not imitate behavior under 
several conditions: a) if the action is unnecessary and does not contribute to the overall 
goal of the task; and b) in an effort to socially connect with others or abide by the social 
norm to be cooperative with an adult, in this case, the experimenter. An explanation of 
the latter is attributable to the social characteristics that inhibit perspective taking in 
autism, which suppresses motivation to imitate a behavior for the sole purpose of 
engaging in shared interests with others.  Typically developing children, on the other 
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hand, tend to be more interested in social engagement as they perform imitation tasks, 
which result in “overimitation,” or reproduction of atypical actions.  
Regarding generalization, there has been an abundance of research using other 
paradigms (i.e. stimulus generalization/preferential looking, multiple baseline across 
settings design), which indicates that children with ASD have difficulties with 
generalization (Church, Rice, Dovgopoloy, Lopata, Thomeer, Nelson, & Mercado, 2015; 
Froehlich, Anderson, Bigler, Miller, Lange, DuBray, Cooperrider, Cariello, Nielsen, & 
Lainhart, 2012).  However, a landmark research experiment by McDonough, Stahmer, 
Shreibman, & Thompson (1997) systematically investigated recall and generalization 
abilities in children with ASD using the generalized imitation procedure. Results revealed 
that children with ASD were indeed capable of imitation and generalization (children 
with ASD are able to imitate actions that were modeled using realistic objects, which is 
indicative of functional play).  Additionally, they were capable of transferring these 
actions and generalizing to placeholder objects (indicative of symbolic play) all while 
retaining correct sequential order of actions.  As mentioned in the categorization chapter, 
different research paradigms yield different results.  The methodology of the generalized 
imitation procedure requires assessment of a child’s cognition based on the intentional 
manipulation of objects and sequencing of actions, which is different from preferential 
looking paradigms that primarily assess perception based on visual preference of two 
dimensional stimuli.  Although the current research project is not investigating 
generalization from functional to symbolic play in children with ASD, the same method 
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of testing will be used. Based ASD children’s success generalization and imitation in the 
aforementioned research, we hypothesize that children with ASD may likewise show 
evidence of overall generalization ability, although we take a non-directional approach 
regarding any performance of action and sequence types across assessment periods. 
In terms of the role that language plays in generalization, although there is no 
research examining event representation in children with ASD using the generalized 
imitation procedure, previous research indicates that language skills and imitation of 
familiar events develop in steps (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni & Volterra, 1979), 
as children at the beginning stages of language acquisition, and those with mild- to 
moderate-autism spectrum disorders, may have difficulties with familiar events (Hobson, 
Lee & Hobson, 2009; Stanley & Konstantareas, 2007).  We therefore hypothesize that 
those with significantly higher language ability will generalize better than those with 
lower language ability. 
Children with Cognitive and Linguistic Disabilities (CLD) 
Regarding imitation assessments on children with cognitive and language delays, 
previous research (Cheatham, Bauer & Georgieff, 2006) indicates that infants born pre-
term compared to their full-term counterparts show deficiencies in imitation tasks 
involving causal sequences. Specifically, there was a correlation between longer 
encoding time and decreased performance in deferred imitation.  Research findings have 
also shown that encoding difficulties could be an issue for infants with low iron status 
born from mothers diagnosed with diabetes mellitus.  Although these infants were able to 
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demonstrate immediate imitation of causal sequences, they were unsuccessful in recalling 
them after a one-week delay (Riggins, Miller, Bauer, Georgieff & Nelson, 2009).  
However, children in the current study will be considerably older, and therefore, we 
expect no difficulties with imitating the event sequences.  Generalization assessments 
have yet to be conducted on this population. 
For children diagnosed with mild- to high-functioning cognitive and linguistic 
disabilities, we expect that as with typically developing children, children with cognitive 
and language delays may be able to demonstrate overall generalization ability, but they 
will also have problems generalizing causal actions and sequences.  However, we 
anticipate that because actions within arbitrary-ordered sequences are not causally 
related, sequential order is not meaningfully encoded.  This may hinder participants’ 
ability to retain the correct sequential order, compared to causal and familiar sequences 
because there is more than one way to achieve the goal of an arbitrary sequence.  
Additionally, based on literature in preterm infants (Cheatham, Bauer & Georgieff, 2006) 
and infants with low iron status due to maternal diabetes mellitus (in which problems 
with encoding yielded lower production of causal actions and sequences) (Riggins, 
Miller, Bauer, Georgieff & Nelson, 2009), children with cognitive and language delays 
may have problems generalizing and imitating causal actions and sequences.  We make 
no predictions regarding differences in generalization performance between the CLD 
group and the ASD group since the current research is the first to explore these clinical 
populations using the generalized imitation paradigm. 
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Regarding language and generalization ability, low functional play is more often 
reported in children with ASD but this is also found with children with language delays 
(see Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer & Sherman, 1987; Lewis, Boucher, Lupton & Watson, 
2000).  Since the CLD group has been diagnosed with language and information-
processing deficits, we expect that language will be correlated with generalization ability.  
Like the actions in generalized event sequences, words are used in multiple contexts via 
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CHAPTER II.     DISSERTATION STUDY 
II.1 Experiment 1: Generalized Event Representation in  




Participants were recruited from a special needs private school located in New 
York City.  Six classes were initially observed before the data collection period: two 
classes of children with low cognitive functioning, three classes with mild- to high-
functioning children, and one integrated class consisting of both high-functioning and 
typically developing children.  These classes were observed for a period of three weeks 
for children to gain familiarity with the experimenter.  After this period of time, each 
child was given a packet that included informed consent forms: audio and video consent 
forms, a form requesting demographic information, and a flyer for parents that described 
the study’s purpose. Of 90 eligible children, 15 agreed to participate—13 boys and 2 
girls. All participants were drawn from the three self-contained classrooms designed for 
mild- to high-functioning children diagnosed with intellectual disabilities, with the goal 
of eventually allowing the students to mainstream into an integrated classroom with 
typically developing children.  Of the 15 children, 14 were diagnosed with cognitive 
processing and language delays (CLD), and 1 was diagnosed with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), specifically with pervasive developmental disorder-not otherwise 
specified (PDD-NOS).  Data from the child diagnosed with ASD was not used in the 
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analysis with the CLD group; rather, the ASD data were reserved for future use when 
data was collected from an exclusively ASD population.  The remaining children with 
cognitive and language delays (CLD, n = 14: 2 girls and 12 boys) were diagnosed with 
varying types of cognitive processing and language/communication disorders with no 
comorbid ASD diagnosis. Five of the children were diagnosed with Specific Language 
Impairment (SLI), six were diagnosed with apraxia of speech, and the remaining children 
were diagnosed with a speech disorder not yet specified.  All children spoke English as 
their primary language.  The mean chronological age of the participants was 4 years, 6 
months (range 3;9 – 4;10 years).  The experimenter was naïve to the diagnoses of the 
participants until after data collection was completed.   
Cognitive Assessment 
Full, verbal, and non-verbal Wechsler scale assessments were previously administered by 
the school psychologist less than 1 year prior to testing in the present experiment (Full IQ 
M = 85; range: 74 – 94; non-verbal IQ M = 85.2; verbal IQ M = 85).  See Table 1 for 







	   60 
Table 1. CLD Children: Demographic Information and IQ Scores 
Participant Chronological Age 
Nonverbal IQ Verbal IQ Full IQ 
Apraxia of Speech: n = 6 
1 4;7 77 75 74 
2 4;6 84 84 83 
3 4;8 91 90 90 
4 4;5 85 85 85 
5 4;6 93 92 93 
6 4;5 91 89 90 
MEAN 4;6 86.8 85.8 85.8 
Specific Language Impairment (SLI): n = 5 
7 3;9 78 76 78 
8 4;10 84 84 84 
9 4;3 74 74 74 
10 4;5 74 74 74 
11 4;2 94 93 94 
MEAN 4;5 80.8 80.2 80.8 
Other Cognitive/Language Delay: n = 3 
12 4;9 90 90 92 
13 4;1 90 90 90 
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14 4;10 88 88 90 
MEAN 4;6 89.3 89.3 90.7 
OVERALL 
MEAN 4;6 
85.2 85 85 
 
General Setting and Materials 
Children were seen individually in a testing area at the school, in an open 
vestibule near administrative offices.  The testing area was approximately 5’x5’ equipped 
with a child-size table, two chairs, a video camera mounted on a tripod and 2 four-drawer 
carts which contained the modeling and generalization props.  The child was invited to 
the testing area and was seated directly across from the experimenter.  Assent was 
obtained prior to each test session and was monitored during sessions to confirm each 
child’s willingness to participate.  All participants complied with the instructions and 
were cooperative for all sessions. 
Two sets of props were used for each of the eight tasks: modeling and 
generalization objects.  The objects were selected so that the targeted activities could be 
produced with each set (each set was functionally similar) yet the objects were divergent 
in terms of their perceptual features such as overall shape, material, and color.  Only one 
test event, the “Make a Rattle” task, consisted of one additional object within the 
modeling and generalization props.  This extra object was a distractor prop, which was 
not a solution for completing the task with the modeling objects but was an essential prop 
for the completing the task with the generalization objects.  A distractor object was also 
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included among the generalization set, which had been essential for completing the task 
with the modeling props.  A detailed list of the modeling and generalization stimuli used 
in each task is listed in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
The session began with two warm-up tasks to facilitate engagement: a) expanding 
and constricting a Slinky toy and b) pushing down on the raised end of a toy see-saw, 
making the toy bunny “hop” off at the other end.  Once the child was comfortable 
interacting with the experimenter and willing to share in the exchange of objects, the test 
session began.  The experimenter gave the child the generalization objects for the first 
task to assess baseline.  Objects were placed in a random array on the table.  The child 
was allowed to play with and manipulate the objects in any way desired for no longer 
than 2 minutes.  Baseline was measured to identify spontaneous discovery of the targeted 
actions without benefit of seeing them modeled.  When the child clearly indicated loss of 
interest, the experimenter retrieved the objects and put them away.  Then the 
experimenter brought out the modeling objects by placing them on the table slightly out 
of reach of the child.  The experimenter said, “Watch what I can do,” and proceeded to 
model the target activities with the modeling objects three times in succession.  As each 
action was modeled, the experimenter provided an accompanying verbalization (see 
Appendix A).  The experimenter then removed the objects and returned the 
generalization objects to the table pushing them towards the child saying “Your turn!” 
and instructing the child to do what the experimenter just did (e.g., “Okay, now you make 
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a rattle!”).  The child was then allowed to manipulate the objects again and the 
experimenter responded by providing neutral but encouraging comments such as “So that 
is what you can do with those things.”  When the child was finished, the experimenter 
retrieved the items and put them away.  The experimenter then brought out the modeling 
items again, said “My turn,” and proceeded to model the activities with the modeling 
objects three times.  This time the modeling objects were returned to the child to assess 
imitation with the instructions “Your turn!”  Again, the child was given neutral praise 
upon completion of any activities regardless of whether they were the target activities.   
Each child received all eight sequences (four familiar and four novel).  To reduce 
fatigue, the tasks were administered in four sessions across two days during which one 
familiar and one novel task was administered per session.   A one-hour break was given 
between the two sessions held on the same day. Testing days were based on the child’s 
willingness to participate with the restriction that participation did not interfere with 
classroom assignments in the school.  Order of task administration was counterbalanced 
among participants.   
Scoring 
Coding.  Most of the test sessions were video recorded for later analysis.  Eleven 
of the 14 children’s test sessions were video recorded and coded live by at least one 
research assistant.   Due to a camera malfunction, four tasks were coded on line by two 
coders for 1 participant out of 11.  The remaining 3 children were coded on line by two 
coders because their parents requested that they not be videotaped.  Research assistants 
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conducting live coding sat behind the child and their presence did not appear to interfere 
with the child’s level of engagement.  Although the coders were aware of the action 
sequences of each task, they were blind to the research hypotheses and diagnoses. 
To assess inter-observer agreement, two raters used the video recording and coded 
one child (eight tasks) independently and compared their observations.  The few 
disagreements were discussed and resolved.   The raters continued to code four children 
independently and overall reliability between was 98% for actions and 98% for correctly 
ordered sequences produced.   
 Actions.  Within each task, the main focus was to examine memory for target 
actions and the order in which they were produced, not simply the precision in producing 
the actions.  Incidences of performance of target actions were credited without 
consideration of ordering.  For future reference, the terms “causal,” “arbitrary” and 
“conventional” are used to describe actions only within the context of the sequences they 
are a part of.   Note that actions are only qualified by their temporal relations with other 
actions within sequences but appear arbitrary in and of themselves.  For novel tasks, 
target actions were derived from test sequences, which were composed of links among 
both causal and arbitrary actions.  The “Make a Rattle” task, for example, consisted of 
three target actions that are temporally constraining: a) put the ball in container, b) cover 
the container with lid and c) shake.  The construction of a rattle requires the performance 
of three causal target actions in one particular sequence, which is impossible to perform 
in any other fashion.  Therefore, the “Make a Rattle” task constituted a maximum of three 
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causal target actions and zero arbitrary actions. Because some tasks constituted a 
combination of both enabling and arbitrary actions (i.e. Go Swimming, Make Spaghetti), 
for the analysis we determined the total possible number of enabling and arbitrary actions 
within each sequence, and also for all sequences for each type of task (novel and familiar) 
(see Appendix A).  Proportion scores were then obtained by the sum of the target actions 
performed by each participant for each sequence type (causal, arbitrary, conventional) 
and task (novel, familiar) to the total possible number of target actions of each sequence 
type for each kind of task (Maximum values: Novel/Causal = 8; Novel/Arbitrary = 7; 
Familiar/Conventional = 16) for baseline, generalization, and imitation measures.   
Sequences.  A sequence is defined as a pair of target actions performed in 
succession.   For example, in the task “Make a Rattle,” if a child 1) put the ball in, 2) 
closed the container with lid, and 3) shook the rattle, the child performed 3 target actions 
and 2 correctly-ordered sequences (for target pairs {1,2} and {2,3}).  The repetition of an 
action that was first done out of order, and then in order of sequence, was not counted to 
eliminate the possibility of achieving temporal order by chance (Bauer & Dow, 1994).  
For instance, if a child’s sequential production was: {3, 1, 2, 3}; although credited for 
three different actions, the child would only be credited for the ordered pair {1, 2}.  
Although the child eventually produced all the actions in the correct order, action 3 
cannot be credited twice.  The tasks were comprised of three kinds of sequences (causal, 
arbitrary and conventional).  Note that although conventional sequences could consist of 
causal and arbitrary actions, these familiar sequences are only linked by virtue of 
	   66 
traditional social customs.  For example, one could put on socks on after putting on 
shoes, but by convention, people typically put on socks before shoes.  Socks are usually 
put on first to protect feet from shoes, keep feet dry, and keep the inside of shoes from 
getting smelly.  Due to the repetitious nature of everyday events, frequency effects could 
be confounding and may explain why some activities within familiar events appear to be 
causally related, when in fact, they are not.  Therefore, it can be quite difficult to 
disentangle causal versus arbitrary actions within familiar sequences.  For instance, 
during a meal, a salad is usually offered before the main course to prepare the palate. 
Alternatively, salad could be offered at the end of a meal to provide a light and refreshing 
finish.  Since testing familiar sequences provides an assessment of everyday event 
representation, the data were collapsed for causal and arbitrary target actions within 
sequences.  The proportion of target actions produced in the correct sequential order to 
the total possible number of target sequences for each sequence type (Maximum values: 
Novel/Causal = 5; Novel/Arbitrary = 6; Conventional=12) was calculated for baseline, 
generalization, and imitation measures.    
Results and Discussion 
Mean Proportion of Target Actions Produced 
Data were analyzed using two dependent measures in order to examine the degree 
to which participants generalized what they saw modeled on one set of objects to a 
second set of perceptually dissimilar objects. The proportion of targeted actions produced 
is the dependent measure for the first set of analyses and the proportion of correctly 
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ordered sequences (pairs of actions produced in the same order they were modeled) is 
examined in the second analyses.  
A preliminary analysis revealed that the proportion of actions in the novel and 
familiar events were produced equally often overall (novel M = 0.83; SE = 0.03; familiar 
M = 0.80; SE = 0.03), p = .225.  Of greater interest to the hypotheses tested were the 
action types within sequences (causal, arbitrary, conventional) rather than novel or 
familiar events per se, so the event factor was not entered into the following analyses.  
Furthermore, the novel events were composed of two types of action sequences, causal 
and arbitrary, and familiar events were composed entirely of conventionally ordered 
sequences.   
Proportion data was used because more conventional (N = 16) than causal (N = 8) 
and arbitrary actions (N = 7) were tested.   A 3 x 3 repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted with Action type (causal, arbitrary, conventional) and 
Assessment (baseline, generalization, imitation) as the within subject factors.  The 
probability of a Type I error was maintained at .05 for all analyses.  We can assume 
sphericity when examining the following significant F-statistics, since the results from 
the Maulchy’s test were all non-significant, indicating that none of the effects violated the 
assumption of sphericity.  We first examined the data by comparing baseline, 
generalization, and imitation scores for each action type.  The main effects were qualified 
by statistical significance between these two factors, F (4, 52) = 12.683, p < .001.  The 
data revealed that significantly more actions were produced for generalization than at 
	   68 
baseline for the arbitrary and conventional actions (Tukey HSD p’s < .01) but not the 
causal actions (p = .838).   These findings suggest that children could generalize what 
they observed to different objects as long as the activity was not involved in a causal 
relation.  
At generalization, children produced significantly fewer causal actions (M = .67; 
SE =  .05) compared to arbitrary (M = .94; SE = .03) and conventional actions (M = .91; 
SE = .02).  One reason for this finding is that these children may have been encoding 
physical characteristics of objects during the modeling period, and using this as a cue for 
causal connections.  However, the encoding did not provide them with any information 
on how to interact with the generalization objects.  In examining the imitation data, we 
expected high performance, since all of the actions were well within the participants’ 
cognitive level.  Looking at differences among the types of actions produced for 
imitation, the proportions of causal (M = 1.00) and arbitrary actions (M = 1.00) produced 
were at ceiling, but significantly greater than the conventional actions (M=0.95; 
SE=0.02) (Tukey HSD p = .043).  Therefore, children were able to demonstrate 
knowledge of the original props that were only used during modeling, but were unable to 
transfer the temporal order of actions during the generalization period. Figure 1 provides 
a summary of mean proportion of actions produced for each action type across each 
assessment period. One should reserve interpretation of this finding, however, until the 
analyses are conducted on the correctly ordered sequences. 
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Figure 1.  Mean proportion of target causal, arbitrary and conventional actions produced 












































Mean Proportion of Correctly Ordered Target Sequences Produced 
For the production of novel and familiar sequences, again, the means did not 
significantly differ (novel M = 0.58; SE = 0.05; familiar M = 0.59; SE = 0.05), p = .861.  
We conducted a 3x3 repeated measures ANOVA with sequence type (causal, arbitrary, 
conventional) and assessment (baseline, generalization, imitation) as the within factors.  
Once again, the interaction was statistically significant, F (4, 52) = 3.637, p= .011. As 
shown in Figure 2, the proportion of sequences for generalization exceeded baseline for 
all three sequence types (p’s < .05). No differences among the sequence types were found 
either at baseline or at generalization. Finally, the item analysis revealed that although 
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children produced fewer sequences in the “Make a Rattle” task, this finding was not 
significant (p = .234). 
Turning to the imitation data, one can see that imitation was significantly greater 
than generalization for the causal and arbitrary sequence types (Tukey HSD p’s <. 05), 
but not for conventional sequences (p = .147).  These data indicate that participants’ 
ability to generalize was not due to forgetting, since children retained memory for the 
original sequences.  Furthermore, it is important to note that children with cognitive and 
language delays had difficulty generalizing with new objects than imitating with the same 
objects (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2.  Mean proportion of target causal, arbitrary and conventional correctly ordered 
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To summarize, in examining the data produced by children with cognitive and 
language delays, the locus of the interaction involved the generalization data.  While 
children produced a greater proportion of arbitrary actions to causal actions, the few 
causal actions that were recalled were produced in correct sequential order.  It appears 
that children were aware of the relations between pairs of actions, which facilitated recall 
of causal sequences. Although not significant, at generalization, the means suggest that 
slightly more conventional sequences (M=0.71; SE=0.05) were produced than the causal 
(M=0.57; SE=0.05) or arbitrary (M=0.56; SE=0.08) sequences.   
Generalization Ability of Novel and Familiar Events and Nonverbal IQ 
Another factor of interest was whether there was a relationship between 
generalization performance and language ability.  The sample recruited for this research 
experiment consisted of a range of children with mild- to high- level of cognitive 
functioning, diagnosed with various cognitive and language/speech delays.  Language 
was assessed via IQ data obtained from participants’ school records.  First, the data were 
reanalyzed for both actions and sequences, with the nonverbal IQ scores included as a 
between-subjects factor using a median-split. We were initially interested in whether 
receptive language correlated with generalization performance because the literature 
suggests that young children with intellectual disabilities (particularly those with 
Williams syndrome), show greater impairment in receptive than expressive language 
(Hudry, Leadbitter, Temple, Slonims, et al., 2010; Maljaars, Noens, Scholte, & van 
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2012; Weismer, S., Lord, C., & Esler, A. 2010) compared to typically 
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developing controls (who show the reverse trend).  However, no significant differences 
were found between the nonverbal IQ scores and generalization abilities for any of the 
within factors of assessment, action types, or sequence types.  Taking a look at other 
verbal data available, we decided to also reanalyze the data with verbal IQ scores as the 
between-subjects factor. Results revealed a main effect of assessment—specifically, 
children with higher verbal IQs performed better than those with lower verbal IQs at 
generalization and imitation (p = .020).  This is not surprising, considering that the 
diagnoses of children in this sample indicated expressive language impairment, and 
therefore, we would expect differences between those with low and high verbal IQ 
scores.  It is important to note, that in typical development, receptive language is higher 
in proportion to productive language—children understand more than they can say.  
However, these children with cognitive and linguistic disabilities were diagnosed with 
impairments that affected their expressive language below the norms, which prompted 
speech intervention.  
To summarize, results indicate that even though those with more severe 
expressive language underperformed on the generalization task compared to their 
counterparts, their nonverbal IQs had no bearing on their abilities to learn a task and to 
transfer this knowledge despite the change in context.  It appears that the receptive 
linguistic abilities in the children with lower verbal IQs gave them some leverage in the 
ability to generalize, although not as optimally as compared to those with higher 
expressive language.   
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Experiment 1 was conducted with the assumption that the modeling objects and 
generalization objects differed perceptually between sets, but functioned similarly.  In 
order to make this claim, however, we need to systematically investigate this assumption. 
The second experiment was conducted to empirically determine whether the stimuli used 
in the Modeling set (Set A) differed systematically from the Generalization set (Set B) 
with respect to perceptual between-category similarity in Experiment 1.  
II.2 Experiment 2: Adult Similarity Judgment of Objects 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
A group of undergraduate students from the Brooklyn College subject pool, N = 
28; 9 males, 19 females (M = 21 years, 5 months; range = 19 – 27 years) participated in 
the experiment.  Testing took place in an 8’x5’ room inside the lab, which consisted of a 
5’x3’ table, and 2 chairs. A small red sticker was placed on the window opposite the 
experimenter approximately 2 feet above the participant chair.   
Each participant sat in a chair, was given a rating scale, and was shown one object 
pair for the pre-test session (plastic whole egg + white golf ball) to ensure that they 
understood the procedure. The object pair was placed on the table—at 1 foot and 6 inches 
distance from each other.  The participant was then given 30 seconds to inspect and 
manipulate the objects. As the object pair was placed on the table, to eliminate 
experimental bias, the experimenter fixated on the red sticker for the duration of the 
inspection time. After the inspection/manipulation period, the participant was asked to 
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rate similarity among the pair of objects on a 7-point rating scale (1 = low similarity; 7 = 
high similarity) along two dimensions: perceptual and conceptual similarity.  The actual 
items on the survey asked the participant to: a) rate objects based on the degree to which 
they looked similar; and b) rate objects based on the degree to which they are the same 
kind of thing. Therefore, participants were instructed to base their similarity judgments 
on the appearance of the stimuli and what they thought the objects represented in the real 
world. Questions about the procedure were clarified after this pre-test period. 
Subsequently, the experimenter proceeded to test the participant with the 30 object pairs 
of Modeling and Generalization that were previously used with the children with 
cognitive and language delays. Table 2 presents the object pairs used in the experiment. 
Notably, object pairs were randomized across tasks and the order of presentation of the 
sets of stimuli was counterbalanced across the sample.   
Table 2. Modeling (Set A) and Generalization (Set B) Stimuli Object Pairs 










Make a Rattle 
purple toothbrush tube red square cubical cover 
2 purple toothbrush tube teal rectangular cubical 
bottom 
3 pink stick orange ball 
4 
Make a Face 
white teeth red tongue 
5 black phone red phone 
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6 orange pointy nose red round nose 
7 green cap green top hat  
with red stripe 
8 
Make Spaghetti 
garlic press Play Doh fun factory 
9 small beige plate with 
black design 
small transparent yellow 
bowl 




yellow watering pitcher 
with long spout 
measuring cup 
12 wind up ladybug wind up frog 
13 red bucket clear fishbowl 




Brown washcloth white bib with  
orange trim 
16 brown teddy bear pink bunny 
17 large yellow bowl Small orange bowl 
18 small Apple Jacks 
cereal box 
tiny Cheerios box 
19 tall skinny white 
pitcher  
short wide white cup 
20 Small beige spoon Small red spoon 
21 Brush Teeth small blue Aqua Fresh 
toothpaste 
small white Crest 
toothpaste 
22 small transparent 
yellow tumbler with 
grooves 
small white cup with 
handle 
23 small blue toothbrush small yellow toothbrush 
24 white washcloth purple washcloth 
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25 Bedtime pink rectangular 
container with slots 
white rectangular 
container 
26 purple cotton onesie 
with pink trim 
red velvet shirt with 
blue trim 
27 Things I Like to Play 
book 
Dumbo book 




29 pink washcloth green washcloth 
30 small circular soap small rectangular soap 
 
Hypothesis 
We hypothesized that for the perceptual dimension, the objects pairs between 
modeling and generalization would be rated as dissimilar while for the conceptual 
dimension, object pairs would be rated as similar. If the results indicated that some object 
pairs were rated as highly similar on the perceptual dimension, a decision was made that 
changes to remove and replace stimuli will take place if and only if at least 2 object pairs 
were rated as highly perceptually similar within a particular test event in the main 
generalization experiment.  The rationale is that each task in the main generalization 
experiment comprises 4-5 test stimuli in each Modeling and Generalization set.  
Retaining at least one perceptually similar object pair as rated by the adult participants 
will reflect some level of ecological validity.  This is because within any event in the real 
world, there is a probability that objects related to actions may be used again (e.g. if 
towels of two different colors for bath time were given high perceptual similarity ratings).  
Therefore, allowing one pair that was rated highly similar will still be able to reveal 
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flexible cognition, because the child has to incorporate the similar object among all of the 
other objects in the test event that were rated highly dissimilar.  For the conceptual 
dimension, if any object has been rated as conceptually dissimilar, it will first be 
considered in the context of the tasks that were given, since for some of the novel tasks, 
the objects were so obscure, that it in isolation, it would be difficult to conceive how 
some of the object pairs could be related.  In the context of the actual generalization task, 
when actions are performed on the modeling objects in a particular sequence, actions 
could be inferred and applied to the generalization objects (e.g. refer to “make a rattle 
task” in Appendix B).   
The purpose of Experiments 1 and 3 is to assess whether children are able to 
generalize the function (or the actions related to the objects) from one set to the other in 
the context of event representation.  Therefore, it is essential that the conceptual 
judgments are perceived as highly similar especially for familiar objects from Set A to 
Set B.  In this experiment, any object pairs for familiar tasks rated as conceptually 
dissimilar will be considered confounding. As such, one of the objects from the pair will 
be replaced with an object that has been rated as functionally similar, after another round 
of judgment ratings by adults.  The replaced object will be used for the replication 
experiment on typically developing children and ASD children.  
Results obtained from the adult sample will be interpreted with caution because 
adult cognition is not the same as cognition in young children. Prior knowledge of many 
of the objects under investigation, combined with fully developed language abilities, 
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gives adults an advantage that young children may not have.  Because time constraints 
with children were a concern, adults were recruited for the experiment.  However, these 
data will yield information about the association between the modeling and 
generalization objects. 
Results and Discussion 
Perceptual similarity. This experiment tested the between-category perceptual similarity 
of the Modeling set (Set A) and the Generalization set (Set B).  Raw scores were entered 
into SPSS for analysis to determine whether the two sets of stimuli were rated differently 
from each other when the adult participants focused solely on the appearance of the 
object pairs (Item 1 on survey for each object pair).  Descriptive statistics revealed that 
out of all object pairs (N = 30), 29 had means ranging from 1.50 – 4.35 (SE mean range: 
.11 - .27).  The only object pair that was rated as highly similar was a green washcloth 
from Set A and a pink washcloth from Set B (M = 6.9; SE Mean = .04). 
Conceptual similarity.  This experiment also tested the between-category conceptual 
similarity of the Modeling set (Set A) and the Generalization set (Set B).  Raw scores 
were entered in SPSS for analysis to determine whether the stimuli of the two sets were 
rated differently from each other when the adult participants rated the objects based on 
whether the object pairs were the same kind of thing or had the same function (Item 2 on 
the survey for each object pair).  Descriptive statistics indicated that out of all object 
pairs, (N = 30), 27 had means ranging from 4.5 – 6.9 (SE mean range: .05 - .29).  Three 
object pairs were rated low in terms of conceptual similarity: pink stick/orange ball (M = 
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2.4; SE mean = .39), red square cover/half of a purple toothbrush holder with ridges (M = 
3.1; SE mean = .35), and teal square container/other half of a purple toothbrush holder 
with ridges (M = 4.2; SE mean = .34).  
 This experiment was conducted as an internal validity check of the initial 
generalization experiment conducted on children with cognitive and language delays to 
test the assumption made that the Modeling (Set A) and Generalization (Set B) stimuli 
object pairs chosen were perceptually different.  In order to conclude that Set A was 
indeed perceptually dissimilar from Set B, we systematically tested this assumption by 
asking adults to make similarity judgments based on appearance alone.  Results indicate 
that of the 30 object pairs, our hypothesis was retained for 29 object pairs, as they were 
rated as quite dissimilar with respect to appearance.  The only pair that was rated as 
perceptually similar was the green washcloth from Set A and the pink washcloth from Set 
B. This result is not surprising because they both were the same size and had the same 
pattern, but the only difference was the color.  
A decision was made to keep both stimuli because within the main generalization 
study, the task in question that the objects were going to be manipulated was the 
“bedtime task.”  In this test event, the washcloths were not going to be used for washing 
but rather as a “blanket” to cover the stuffed animal.  Therefore, the function of the object 
was not going to be used in a literal sense and the task would require that the child inhibit 
the normal usage of the washcloth and generalize to another color based on the action 
modeled by the experimenter.  Regarding conceptual similarity judgments, 3 of 30 object 
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pairs were rated on the low end of the scale.  This was not surprising, however, because 
the three object pairs (pink stick/orange ball, red square cover/half of a purple toothbrush 
holder with ridges, and teal square container/half of a purple toothbrush holder with 
ridges) are all objects in the “make a rattle” task.  The “make a rattle” test event is one of 
the novel tasks that has the most obscure objects in the experiment that could have been 
difficult to consider in isolation how the object pairs were related.  As mentioned 
previously, actions were only qualified by their temporal relations with other actions 
within sequences, but appear arbitrary in and of themselves.  Therefore, in the context of 
the experiment, as the experimenter modeled actions with the modeling objects in a 3-
step sequence, one could infer how to generalize these actions to the generalization 
objects.  Therefore the decision was made to retain these 3 object pairs in the replication 
experiment assessing children with ASD and typically developing children. 
II.3 Experiment 3: Replication of Generalized Event Representation Experiment 
with Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and  
Typically Developing Children (TD) 
Method 
Participants  
 Twenty children, between the ages of 3 years; 6 months, and 6 years; 10 months, 
participated in the third experiment.  They represented two distinct diagnostic categories: 
ASD and typical development (TD).  We only recruited children whose primary language 
spoken at home was English. Table 3 presents participants’ demographic information. 
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Typically Developing Children 
 A sample of typically developing children (TD, n = 10: 3 girls, and 7 boys), were 
recruited from a Head Start program from the same early childhood education pre-school 
as the sample of children with ASD.  The mean chronological age was 4 years, 7 months 
(range 3;6 – 5;5).   
Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
 Children with ASD (n = 10: 10 boys) were recruited from self-contained 
classrooms at an early childhood education pre-school and an after-school program in 
Brooklyn, NY. These children had been classified within the range of ASD according to 
the DSM-IV-TR (e.g. autism, Asperger syndrome, or pervasive developmental 
disorder—not otherwise specified) prior to school entry. The mean chronological age of 
participants was 4 years, 10 months (range 4;3 – 5;11).  Although the experimenter had 
knowledge of participants’ diagnoses in general, the experimenter was naïve to any 
specific diagnostic information of individual children with ASD until after all data were 
collected.  Additionally, all diagnostic instruments (e.g. Childhood Autism Rating Scale) 
administered during research tasks were scored after all tasks were completed.  
Diagnostic and Cognitive Assessments 
For assessments, the experimenter administered all tests, while a trained research 
assistant conducting on-line coding sat approximately 3 feet behind the child. The 
research assistant’s presence did not appear to interfere with participants’ level of 
engagement or distractibility.   
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Confirmation of Autism Diagnosis: Childhood Autism Rating Scale, 2nd edition.  
Participants in the ASD group (n = 10) were all diagnosed according to DSM-IV criteria 
prior to enrollment into preschool, which was the basis for separate, specialized 
instruction at the pre-school.  The experimenter administered the Childhood Autism 
Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, & Ronchen Renner, 1988) while also 
performing the test events in Experiment 3.  The CARS is a brief, valid, and reliable 
classification system for the diagnosis of autism (e.g., Chlebowski, Green, Garton, & 
Fein, 2010; Schopler et al. 1988; Tachimori, Osada, & Kurita, 2003).  The CARS rates 
behavioral characteristics of autism in 14 areas.  The rating scale for each area ranges 
from 1 to 4, with higher scores reflecting lower level of functioning.  Overall scores 
range from 15 to 37+.  Children who score below 30 are considered minimal- to non-
autistic, scores between 30 and 36.5 indicate mild- to moderate autism, and scores 
between 37 and 60 indicate severe autism (Schopler et al. 1988).   
Although most of the items were recorded online by a research assistant, videos 
used in the main research study were also used to obtain data.  Furthermore, responses 
from the CARS parent forms were considered in an effort to corroborate observed 
behaviors during testing.  The mean total raw score was 25.8 (range: 20.5 – 32.0), 
classifying this sample of children with ASD in the upper minimal- no ASD category.  
These children were thus characterized as having high-functioning ASD (as opposed to 
no ASD) since they were diagnosed with the disorder prior to being enrolled at the 
school, and were in self-contained ASD classrooms as a result.   
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Nonverbal Evaluation: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 4th edition.  The Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test: 4th edition (Dunn & Dunn, 2007) was administered to determine 
the verbal ability of ASD and TD children because no prior verbal IQ record was on file 
at the time of testing.  It was also conducted to examine correlations between language 
and generalization abilities.  The PPVT-IV is a norm-referenced, wide-range instrument 
that evaluates comprehension of the spoken word in Standard English, and therefore, is a 
measure of an examinee’s receptive vocabulary knowledge (Dunn & Dunn, 1997).  All 
participants in the current experiment spoke English as their primary language.  The test 
measures linguistic potential and is appropriate for those with expressive-language 
impairments, written-language difficulties, or extreme motor/speech impairments.  Each 
PPVT item consists of two parts: the stimulus word and an array of four full-color art 
drawings—one of which is an illustration of the stimulus word.  The other three pictures 
in the array are distractors that are appealing choices for participants who are unsure of 
the correct answer.  The child is asked either to point or to say the number of the picture 
that corresponds to the stimulus word.   
From the TD group, 6 boys and 3 girls were administered the PPVT test.  Due to 
absences during days of testing, 1 child was unable to participate.  The mean total raw 
score for the TD children was 85.7 (range: 66 – 103).  In the ASD sample, 9 boys were 
administered the PPVT test. One child with ASD from the school with children with 
cognitive and language delays (from Experiment 1) was not given the PPVT test at the 
time the research was conducted at the school.  The mean total raw score for the ASD 
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participants was 85.8 (range: 42 – 126).  Like IQ tests, the norm score for the PPVT is 
100.  Table 3 presents participants’ demographic information and PPVT-IV scores. 
Table 3. Demographic Information, CARS-2, and PPVT-IV Assessment Scores 
Participant Chronological Age (y;m) 
PPVT Score CARS-2 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): n = 10 
1 4;8 74 20.5 
2 5;11 126 20.5 
3 4;8 96 32 
4 4;9 97 21 
5 4;6 64 27.5 
6 4;11 92 31.5 
7 4;11 42 22 
8 4;9 123 30 
9 4;3 59 22.5 
10 4;10 - 30.5 
MEAN 4;10 85.8 25.8 
Typically Developing: n = 10 
1 4;7 82  
2 4;10 66 
3 4;2 69 
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4 4;4 86 
5 4;4 81 
6 5;5 99 
7 3;6 96 
8 4;8 - 
9 4;10 103 
10 4;11 89 
MEAN 4;7 85.7 
OVERALL MEAN 4;9 85.7 
 
Materials 
Materials used in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 1.   
Setting.  Children were seen individually at school in an unoccupied administrative 
office.  The testing area was equipped with a child-sized table, three child-sized chairs 
(for child, experimenter, and research assistant), a video camera mounted on a tripod, and 
2 four-drawer carts, which contained the modeling and generalization props.  Each child 
was invited to the testing area and seated directly across from the experimenter.  Because 
each child was on a behavioral plan, the children with ASD were accompanied by a 
teacher, therapist, or parent during each testing session for support and to redirect any 
inappropriate or distracting behaviors (e.g. getting up from seat, throwing toys).  The 
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teachers and therapists were clearly instructed not to lead participants to any response and 
not to reinforce correct responses. 
Procedure 
The test session was administered exactly the same as in Experiment 1.  
Scoring 
Coding.  The test sessions were video recorded for later analysis. Although the 
coders were aware of the action sequences of each task, they were blind to the research 
hypotheses. In order to achieve inter-observer agreement, two raters used the video 
recording and coded one child (8 tasks) independently and compared their observations.  
The few disagreements were discussed and resolved. The raters continued to code four 
children independently and overall reliability between them was 99% for actions and 
99% for the ordered sequences produced. 
 Actions.  As in Experiment 1, proportion scores were obtained by the sum of the 
target actions performed by each participant for each sequence type (causal, arbitrary, 
conventional) and task (novel, familiar) divided by the total possible number of target 
behaviors of each sequence type for each kind of task (Maximum values: Novel/Causal = 
8; Novel/Arbitrary = 7; Familiar/Conventional = 16) for baseline, generalization, and 
imitation measures.   
Sequences. As in Experiment 1, the proportion of target behaviors produced in the 
correct sequential order to the total possible number of target sequences for each 
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sequence type (Maximum values: Novel/Causal = 5; Novel/Arbitrary = 6; 
Conventional=12) was calculated for baseline, generalization, and imitation measures.   
Results and Discussion 
The mean proportion of targeted actions produced was the first dependent 
measure analyzed, followed by the mean proportion of correctly ordered sequences (pairs 
of actions produced in the same order they were modeled).  
A preliminary analysis revealed that the proportion of actions in the novel and 
familiar events were produced equally often overall (novel M = 0.81, SE = 0.03; familiar 
M = 0.81, SE = 0.23) p = .899.  The analysis also revealed equal performance of novel 
and familiar correctly ordered target sequences (novel M = .64, SE = .04; familiar M = 
.68, SE = .04), p = .200.  We were particularly interested in the assessment of actions and 
correctly ordered sequences with the manipulation of causal, arbitrary, and conventional 
action and sequence types that were embedded within the robust categories of the novel 
and familiar events.  
Mean Proportion of Target Actions Produced  
A 3 x 3 mixed factorial repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted with Assessment (baseline, generalization, imitation), and Action type (causal, 
arbitrary, conventional) as the within-subject factors and Diagnosis (TD, ASD) as the 
between-subject factor.  The probability of a Type I error was maintained at .05 for all 
analyses, and sphericity was assumed for any significant values, since Maulchy’s test 
were all non-significant.  The main effect of assessment was qualified by statistical 
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significance, F (2, 36) = 95.47, p < .001, and post hoc comparisons revealed that more 
actions were produced at generalization (M = .890, SE = .016) than at baseline (M = .576, 
SE = .035), with the greatest amount of actions produced at the imitation assessment (M 
= .962, SE = .014).  There was also a main effect for action type, F (2, 36) = 3.26, p = .05 
with fewer causal actions produced (M = .769, SE = .028) than arbitrary (M = .848, SE = 
.016) and conventional actions (M = .810, SE = .025).  However, the between-subjects 
factor for Diagnosis was not significant, F (1, 18) < 1, ns.  Furthermore, in examining the 
data for an interaction comparing assessment scores for each action type, no statistically 
significant interactions were found, indicating that typically developing children and 
those with ASD performed equally well in producing target actions irrespective of the 
various types that were manipulated (causal, arbitrary, conventional) across three 
assessment periods (Figure 3). Additionally, although the children with ASD produced 
fewer causal actions at baseline, they showed greater improvement from baseline to 
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Figure 3.  Mean proportion of target causal, arbitrary and conventional actions produced 
at baseline, generalization and imitation in ASD and TD children.  Standard errors are 
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Mean Proportion of Correctly Ordered Sequences Produced 
We next examined the mean proportion of correctly ordered sequences. A 3 x 3 
mixed factorial repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the data with 
Assessment (baseline, generalization, imitation) and Sequence type (causal, arbitrary, 
conventional) as the within factors, and Diagnosis (TD, ASD) as the between-subject 
factor.  The only F-statistic that was significant was the main effect for assessment, F (2, 
36) = 100.08, p < .001. As shown in Figure 4, the mean proportion of sequences for 
generalization exceeded baseline. The imitation data revealed a higher proportion of 
sequences produced at imitation compared to generalization (Tukey HSD p’s < .001).  As 
with the actions produced no significant interactions were found (comparing assessment 
scores for each sequence type, including the 3-way interaction that included the between-
subject factor of Diagnosis). Given that perseveration of sameness is one of the subtypes 
of the restricted and repetitive behaviors (RRBs), one would expect difficulty on some 
level with transfer of knowledge once the props have been changed.  Looking at 
individual data, although this task appeared difficult for some of the ASD children, 
overall, when shown the modeling props (Set A), these children were able to abstract the 
actions in the correct order and apply their knowledge to carry out the event sequences at 
generalization with the Set B props.  Notably, as with the actions, the children with ASD 
produced very few sequences at baseline (M = .260; SE = .090) but showed greater 
improvement at generalization compared to TD children (see Figure 4).  Sequences at 
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imitation yielded ceiling effects, but again, this is not surprising, given that the task was 
well within their cognitive level. 
Figure 4.  Mean proportion of target causal, arbitrary, and conventional correctly ordered 
sequences produced at baseline, generalization, and imitation in ASD and TD children.  
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Generalization Abilities and Receptive Language Data in ASD and TD children 
As with the children with cognitive and language delays, we were especially 
interested in investigating whether receptive language was a factor (irrespective of 
diagnosis) in generalization performance in novel and familiar events in children with 
ASD and typically developing controls. Because IQ data was not available at the testing 
school, we administered the PPVT-4 to both ASD and TD groups. The data were 
reanalyzed with the PPVT scores as a between-subjects factor and no interactions of any 
kind were found between this nonverbal measure and generalization abilities.  It appears 
that the ASD preschoolers performed equally well as the TD children in many areas, and 
any nonverbal differences did not hinder their production of actions and sequences in this 
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task involving generalization in the context of event representation.  Research by Mundy, 
Sigman, Ungerer & Sherman (1987) supports these findings by showing that receptive 
language is highly correlated with play in children with autism.   
Comparison between Experiments 1 and 3 (CLD, TD, and ASD Groups) 
A final examination was conducted on all collected data from the three groups 
(CLD: n = 14; TD: n = 10; ASD: n = 10) to determine if the between-group factor of 
Diagnosis yielded any interactions.  
Mean Proportion of Target Actions Produced  
A 3 x 3 mixed factorial repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted with Assessment (baseline, generalization, imitation), and Action type (causal, 
arbitrary, conventional) as the within-subject factors, and Diagnosis (CLD, TD, ASD) as 
the between-subject factor.   The probability of a Type I error was maintained at .05 for 
all analyses, and sphericity was assumed for any significant values, since Maulchy’s test 
were all non-significant.   
Actions.  Main effects were found for Assessment (p < .001) and Action type (p < .001).  
All children produced the fewest target actions at baseline (M = .598, SE = .025), a 
greater production of actions at the generalization period (M = .873, SE = .014), and the 
greatest at imitation (M = .969, SE = .009).  Participants also produced fewer causal (M = 
.769, SE = .019) than conventional actions (M = .807, SE = .018), and produced the most 
arbitrary actions (M = .865, SE = .016).   
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The two 2-way interactions that were found with Diagnosis as one of the factors 
were reflected in 3-way interaction of Assessment x Action type x Diagnosis, F (8, 124) 
= 2.565, p = .013.  The locus of the interaction was at the baseline and generalization 
assessment periods. As shown in Figure 5, the ASD children produced fewer target 
actions at baseline (M = .388, SE = .072) than the TD children (M = .650, SE = .072) and 
the CLD children (M = .643, SE = .061).  However, at generalization, the ASD children 
caught up and performed as equally well as TD children.  Although it appears that all 
groups performed fewer causal than arbitrary and conventional actions at generalization, 
this result was not significant for the TD (M = .800, SE = .053) and ASD (M = .825, SE 
= .053) children.  However, this difference was only significant for the CLD children (M 
= .670, SE = .045), p < .001.  Although the CLD children performed as comparable as the 
TD children at baseline (and even better than the ASD children), causal actions appeared 
to be more difficult for CLD children to generalize from baseline than other action types, 
and compared to the other diagnostic groups.  Ceiling effects were found at imitation—
children from all diagnostic groups were apt at imitating the actions and sequences 









	   95 
Figure 5.  Mean proportion of target causal, arbitrary, and conventional actions produced 
by typically developing (TD) children, children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
and children with cognitive and language delays (CLD) at baseline, generalization, and 
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Sequences. A 3 x 3 mixed factorial repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted with Assessment (baseline, generalization, imitation), and Sequence type 
(causal, arbitrary, conventional) as the within-subject factors, and Diagnosis (CLD, TD, 
ASD) as the between-subject factor.  The probability of a Type I error was maintained at 
.05 for all analyses, and sphericity was assumed.  A main effect was found for 
Assessment, F (2, 62) = 172.671, p < .001, with the same trend as actions, in which the 
fewest proportion of sequences was produced at baseline (M = .302, SE = .025), greater 
performance at generalization (M = .684, SE = .030), and ceiling effects at imitation (M = 
.902, SE = .020).  An interaction was found for Assessment x Sequence type, F (4, 124) = 
3.441, p  = .011.  However, performance of the various sequence types was not 
significant at any of the assessment periods.  Furthermore, there were no diagnostic 
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CHAPTER III: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
One of the defining characteristics of ASD is perseveration of sameness or 
resistance to adapting to change in everyday life.  Sequential understanding of actions 
that occur in reoccurring everyday events is essential in that it allows us to predict future 
events by accessing the memory for the objects, actors, individual actions, and correct 
temporal order of actions within the event.  Additionally, because event representation is 
a flexible construct that accounts for potential variability that may occur when faced with 
a similar novel situation, it also requires the cognitive process of generalization, or the 
ability to access familiar knowledge and ignore irrelevant details, and spontaneously 
abstract and apply the relevant information, which in turn, enriches the original event 
schema.   
Research has not systematically investigated event representation in children with 
ASD.  TD children spontaneously generalize what they learn, often to the extent of over-
generalizing activities to somewhat inappropriate situations or objects (Mandler & 
McDonough, 1996). However, children with ASD often establish rigid routines (Whalen, 
2009) and have difficulties generalizing what they learn due to their tendency to focus on 
specific details. After learning a new skill, they often need to be explicitly taught to 
generalize that knowledge to other contexts.  Intervention programs with children with 
intellectual disabilities, and with ASD in particular, train children to carry out target 
behaviors using reinforcement schedules in limited contexts.  Yet a problem with these 
types of interventions is that training does not spontaneously generalize to other 
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appropriate objects or contexts, thus limiting the effectiveness of intervention. One 
source of cognitive delays in children with intellectual disabilities could be attributable to 
poor generalization of learning.   
The generalized imitation paradigm, which had been primarily conducted on TD 
children, was implemented in the current research experiments to test the extent to which 
cognitive flexibility regarding event knowledge is possible in children with mild- to high-
functioning ASD in comparison to children with cognitive and language delays (CLD), 
and typically developing controls (TD).  With the use of miniature objects, we examined 
the generalization and recall of actions and correctly ordered 3- to 4-step sequences in 
novel and familiar events. Not only did we investigate generalization of individual 
actions, but we also assessed how well our participants could generalize the sequential 
order of an event as a function of sequence types (causal, arbitrary, conventional).  
Causal and arbitrary actions within novel sequences provide an understanding of 
children’s episodic memory, whereas production of conventional sequences in familiar 
tasks is indicative of event representation of everyday occurrences (Bauer & Mandler, 
1992; Bauer, 1992).   
III.1 Performance of CLD, ASD, and TD Groups 
In examining the results from all three groups, findings were consistent with our 
initial hypotheses that overall, regardless of diagnoses, children would be able to figure 
out the functions of objects. Participants demonstrated this ability by generalizing these 
functions to new objects that differed in color, shape, size and texture.  Given that there 
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were two groups of participants in the present experiment diagnosed with intellectual 
disabilities, we took a non-directional approach to our hypothesis about their 
generalization abilities with respect to particular types of temporal relations between 
actions (causal, arbitrary and conventional).  It was difficult to make a clear prediction 
because their chronological ages are considerably older than the TD children tested in 
previous research.  Regardless of diagnosis, all groups generalized fewer causal actions, 
which confirms previous research on generalization research in young TD children that 
causal actions and sequences are more difficult than arbitrary ones to carry out with new 
objects (Bauer, Dow, Bittinger & Wenner, 1998; Bauer & Fivush, 1992; Fivush, Kuebli 
& Clubb, 1992).  Regardless of age, we considered it possible that all groups would find 
it easier to generalize the familiar events in their canonical order because they had seen 
them produced in the same manner with several varying objects over their lifetime. 
In ascertaining where the most extreme differences were found, the data are clear: 
although one would expect children with ASD to perform poorly on the generalized 
imitation tasks due to their unique insistence of sameness symptomology, it was the CLD 
group whose data yielded many more differences, specifically, the lowest production of 
causal actions at generalization compared to the ASD and TD groups (see Figure 6 for a 
summary of actions for each diagnostic group).  This result was partially anticipated 
because some research on the generalization of actions has shown that TD children 
sometimes find causal sequences more difficult to generalize (Bauer & Fivush, 1992; 
Bauer, Dow, Bittinger & Wenner, 1998).  While the TD and ASD groups did generalize 
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fewer causal actions compared to arbitrary and conventional ones, the mean proportion of 
target actions was much higher than for the CLD group.  
Figure 6.  Mean proportion of target causal, arbitrary, and conventional correctly ordered 
sequences produced by typically developing (TD) children, children with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD), and children with cognitive and language delays (CLD) at 
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 Of particular interest was the generalization of correctly ordered sequences, or 
the correct ordering of target actions (correct in terms of the order in which the actions 
were modeled), a cognitive ability that is especially important for problem solving and 
everyday event representation. While object generalization of 3-step sequences is found 
as early as 16 months in typically developing children (Bauer & Dow, 2004), to date, 
research has not investigated generalization in pre-school TD children or those with 
intellectual disabilities. The current research provides evidence that without consideration 
of the various sequence types (causal, arbitrary and conventional) all high-functioning 
children, regardless of diagnosis, have some capacity to abstract the function and 
generalize their knowledge to perceptually dissimilar objects of novel and familiar 
sequences (main effect for assessment periods: baseline, generalization, imitation, p < 
.001).  After briefly observing a task being modeled, all groups readily generalized the 
function of various objects within events while accurately preserving the sequential 
ordering of target actions with functionally equivalent exemplars.  Results further 
indicate that performance increased dramatically when children were given the 
opportunity to manipulate the modeling objects, which occurred only after the 
generalization period.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that no interaction was found with diagnosis as a 
factor. Although participants substantially generalized causal sequences from baseline 
(baseline causal mean = .36; generalization causal mean = .57), the production of 
proportion of causal (M = .57) versus arbitrary (M = .54) sequences was not statistically 
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significant at generalization. While children with cognitive and language delays had 
difficulties generalizing causal actions compared to the other types, the few target causal 
actions that they were able to recall were successfully produced in the correct temporal 
order, and performed as equally well as the other groups.  This suggests that although 
participants found it difficult to generalize some actions, they took advantage of 
understanding relations and correct order for the few pairs of causal actions that they 
were able to generalize; therefore, they appear capable of generalized sequential 
understanding.   
Regarding the imitation assessment, a ceiling pattern was found for all groups, 
which was expected since their motor skills were intact (participants therefore should 
have been capable of imitating what they saw).  The dependent measure of importance, 
however, was flexible transfer of actions and sequences on new objects in events, and we 
found that the generalization assessment period was quite difficult for these children. 
How did children with mild- to high-functioning ASD fare? Results indicate that 
like their TD counterparts, children with mild- to high-functioning ASD were able to 
generalize and imitate actions in the correct order within test events in novel and familiar 
tasks.  With diagnosis as a between-subjects factor, no interactions were found. Given the 
symptomatology of autism, one would expect perseveration tendencies to hinder 
flexibility in learning. These data also seem to fly in the face of the autism literature, 
which suggests that because of social deficits (Ingersoll, 2008) or information-processing 
difficulties (Smith & Bryson, 1994), children with autism are incapable of imitating the 
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behaviors of others in a purposive way, let alone generalize to new contexts due to 
cognitive inflexibility and difficulties with abstraction (Church, Rice, Dovgopoloy, 
Lopata, Thomeer, Nelson, & Mercado, 2015; Froehlich, Anderson, Bigler, Miller, Lange, 
DuBray, Cooperrider, Cariello, Nielsen, & Lainhart, 2012).   
The current experiments also support one of the few research studies 
(McDonough, Stahmer, Shreibman, & Thompson, 1997) to reveal that not only are 
children with autism capable of immediate imitation, but also generalization of actions 
and correctly ordered sequences with more obscure, abstract objects.  McDonough and 
colleagues note that because their experiment was conducted in a highly structured 
laboratory setting, it is unclear whether this finding would generalize in naturalistic 
settings where distractions are difficult to control. Informal reports by parents and 
caretakers suggest that children with ASD have “favorite” items that are often part of 
daily routines to which considerable turmoil becomes evident should other items be 
substituted for these favorites. Therefore, the researchers questioned whether 
perseveration of sameness, and the failure to generalize, is evident not only in newly 
learned skills but also in skills they have learned in more naturalistic, everyday settings.  
Replication of these results as a function of change in test setting in an effort to increase 
external validity remained an issue left unexplored. The current research attempted to 
address this issue by examining whether children with ASD would be able to generalize 
and imitate novel and familiar tasks in a more naturalistic setting (at their school, in an 
office or open cubicle near classrooms, with a teacher/therapist/parent present), thereby 
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increasing ecological validity.  We found that participants with ASD still yielded 
significant results in the generalization task in these naturalistic settings, despite 
increased levels of distractibility.  
Given that insistence on sameness is a defining characteristic of autism, one 
would expect diminished generalization performance in the current experiment compared 
to other groups.  However, it was not the children with ASD, but the group of children 
with cognitive and language delays that demonstrated poorer performance compared to 
the other groups. Participants in the CLD group did not meet criteria for autism and 
insistence on sameness is not a defining symptom associated with any other intellectual 
disability. How is it then, that the cognitive and language delayed group, although they 
demonstrated within-group success, showed more differences in generalization ability 
under the same circumstances in comparison to the ASD and TD groups? A possible 
explanation for the underperformance of causal actions is that children are encoding the 
ordering of the sequences and function along with some physical characteristics of the 
objects themselves. Because actions in causal tasks enable particular outcomes, children 
may be processing the perceptual details of the modeling objects, details that may or may 
not be essential for the outcomes to occur. Such precise encoding is likely prohibiting 
them from generalizing to new props that have different appearances.  
III.2 Limitations and Future Research 
 A limitation of the current research is the small number of participants in each 
group (N = 34; CLD = 14, TD = 10, ASD = 10).  Increased sample size not only would 
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increase the power of the experiment but would also allow us to generalize to the larger 
population. However, the participants were evenly matched on age (CLD: 4 years, 6 
months; TD: 4 years, 7 months; ASD: 4 years, 10 months) and non-verbal ability (CLD 
nonverbal IQ M = 85.2; TD PPVT = 86; ASD PPVT M = 86), and despite this, 
differences were still observed. 
Another limitation is that not all groups were administered the same language 
assessments. The CLD children were the first participants tested at the beginning of this 
research project that spanned 4 years. While verbal IQ data of the CLD children was 
available at their testing school, this information did not exist for the TD and ASD 
children, who attended a different school. Due to the stringent time constraint allocated 
for conducting research at the school, we were unable to administer IQ tests to these 
participants, and therefore, administered the PPVT-IV in an effort to obtain receptive 
vocabulary data. However, interpretations could still be made based on the data available, 
since in the literature, both receptive (Lewis, Boucher, Lupton, Watson, 2000; Mundy, 
Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman, 1987) and expressive language (Honey, Leekam, Turner, 
& McConachie, 2007) are good predictors of functional play in typically developing 
children and children with intellectual disabilities.  
In addressing whether the experiment should have manipulated perceptual 
dimensions of objects in the task to pinpoint which dimension was easier or more 
difficult to generalize to, this was not the focus of the current experiment, as our 
objective was to increase ecological validity.  Previous research by Son, Smith & 
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Goldstone (2008) examined generalization ability by degrading all physical attributes 
except for shape. These authors found that performance improves in young children when 
they are shown new props after the intermediate training period with the degraded 
objects.  However, in the current research, the variability of stimuli was intentional for 
two reasons. The ultimate goal of this research project was to assess generalization, and 
we wanted to make the research study as naturalistic as possible, while still maintaining 
the integrity of the experiment. First, in the real world context, objects that people 
manipulate within events are not controlled for—we generalize and are creative with tool 
use depending on which objects are immediately available.  A hanger, for example, could 
be used in many ways: it can hang clothes, hook and retrieve objects, unclog sinks, and 
unlock doors. Generalization ability in everyday life fluctuates depending on the task and 
available resources. Therefore, our ability to generalize must adapt according to the 
current task or problem based on objects that are immediately available. Second, although 
we initially tested children with CLD, the goal was to target the population of children 
with ASD.  Children with ASD reportedly are unable to generalize and maintain skills 
without consideration of perceptual detail and context and this may account for why they 
establish rigid routines (Plaisted, 2001). We wanted to replicate this naturalistic 
methodology to assess generalization and event representation in this particular 
population. Deciding to select objects for the generalization props that only differed from 
the modeling props by one physical element (i.e. color, size, shape) is essentially 
reinforcing rigidity, which would be counterproductive for the purpose of this research.  
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Future research in event representation in ASD should examine how rigid or 
tenuous these children’s episodic memories really are.  If an unrelated action occurs 
within an event that a child encounters for the first time (novel event), what is the 
likelihood that the child would incorporate that unrelated action, should he or she 
encounter the same event the next day?  This could be investigated by administering the 
deferred imitation method. Many studies with TD children (Bauer, 2002; Bauer & Thal 
1990; Mandler & McDonough, 1995, 1998) have utilized Piaget’s deferred imitation 
method (1952) to investigate representational capacity. Deferred imitation has 
noteworthy reliability and assesses nonverbal long-term recall and representation in 
infants, children, and adults (McDonough, Mandler, McKee & Squire, 1995).  
 According to the weak central coherence theory (Happe & Frith, 2006), 
individuals with ASD have a tendency to process information locally and invest in 
accuracy at the expense of meaning or understanding the bigger picture. Because 
individuals with ASD tend to rely on specific details of events, we would expect that 
even after a time delay, they would incorporate the unrelated object-action within the 
sequence. On the other hand, when given similar tasks, TD children tend to be aware of 
causal relations and thus imitate causal sequences with ease (Mandler & McDonough 
1995).  Any unrelated object-action is either performed at the end of the sequence as an 
afterthought or is not acknowledged (Bauer, Dow, Bittinger, & Wenner, 1998).   
Therefore, given that children with ASD were able to imitate causal sequences in the 
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current experiment, it is possible that ASD children would be able to perform the 
unrelated object-action at the end of the sequence, or not at all. 
III.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Results suggest that the recall, generalization and ordering of both causal and 
arbitrary sequences after a brief exposure to modeling is indicative of episodic event 
memories.  On the other hand, we can surmise that children’s ability to recall and 
generalize the correct order of familiar events (i.e. bath time, bed time) demonstrates the 
acquisition of everyday event representation, or script knowledge.  Generalized 
knowledge of events serves as a guide for predicting what to expect in similar events in 
the future despite slight changes in context.  For example, Billy, a child with a particular 
bedtime routine at home would not deviate much from the central components of his 
routine when away at his grandmother’s house. Because generalization is a cognitive 
process that naturally allows for some variability within an event, over time, the child’s 
reasoning about bedtime will accommodate superfluous components that may occur at 
his grandmother’s house, which is a different environment than his home and with 
different rules.  Perhaps at grandma’s house, Billy is allowed to eat a snack right before 
sleep or sleep on the couch with a night-light—actions that are never done at home.  
However, Billy is able to adjust because actions that are central to his bedtime script (i.e. 
brushing teeth, changing into pajamas, going to sleep) are still intact. Sequential 
understanding is important for anticipating the course of action in event representation, 
especially for central components that appear to be enabling and contributing to the end 
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goal.  For instance, one must open the toothpaste before squeezing it onto the toothbrush 
and subsequently brushing teeth. Performing these actions in any other sequence is either 
useless (squeezing toothpaste onto toothbrush before opening the toothpaste first) or does 
not contribute to the goal of the task (brushing teeth with toothbrush before putting 
toothpaste on toothbrush). Thus, generalization combined with sequential knowledge is a 
mechanism that facilitates problem-solving abilities.    
The research is the first of its kind to explore the extent to which cognition is 
flexible in children with autism. Also, the current study challenges the assumption of 
insistence on sameness, the characteristic uniquely related to autism, as a cognitive deficit 
that greatly hinders generalization, and therefore, event representation.  The purpose of 
the current research was to investigate how children with autism mentally organize 
routine events that occur everyday to predict future events and the extent to which they 
are able to flexibly apply what they have learned to novel situations. A question, one not 
well addressed, concerns the underlying processes that guide the rigidity with which 
those with autism interact with the world. Given the amount of “sameness” and 
predictability they seem to want in their daily lives, it would appear that generalization is 
overly narrow. Without the ability to generalize, the ability to predict future events is also 
compromised. Without expectations or with narrowly defined expectations, it becomes 
more understandable why those with autism would have difficulties encoding and 
organizing new experiences. But perhaps it is our attention that is too narrowly focused.  
These children may do significantly more generalization than previously thought. 
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Current results reveal that contrary to previous findings mild- to high-functioning 
pre-school children with ASD do generalize across contexts (McDonough, Stahmer, 
Schreibman, & Thompson, 1997).  Furthermore, our results are consistent with other 
findings that children with ASD engage in global processing (central coherence), but only 
when explicitly instructed (Happe & Frith, 2006), or depending on their level of narrative 
comprehension (Nuske & Bavin, 2010). According to individual longitudinal data, some 
young children with ASD do show considerable cognitive strides in executive function 
and theory of mind (Pellicano, 2010).   
Research increasingly suggests that there are islets of cognitive strengths in high 
functioning autistics, including the ability to identify complex patterns more readily than 
typically developing children (Remington, Swettenham, Lavie, 2012; Mottron, Dawson, 
et al., 2006; O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001), and detecting 
underlying complex algorithms in some domains (math, chess) (Baron-Cohen, 2002; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Burtenshaw, Hobson, 2007; Banda, McAfee, Lee, & 
Kubina, 2007). The mild- to high-functioning children with ASD in the present study 
(compared to their CLD peers) perhaps demonstrated overall superior results by utilizing 
their enhanced perceptual expertise to selectively attend to the underlying pattern of the 
task itself (the actions and sequences modeled), abstracted this pattern, and generalized to 
the new set of props.  Thus, they performed well on this task, at least as equally as well as 
the TD group, and even better than non-autistic children with cognitive/language delays. 
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Expressive language deficits in the CLD children seem to have impeded the 
ability to generalize at the level of their mentally matched ASD cohorts because the 
higher verbal IQ CLD children generalized better than those with lower verbal IQs. There 
is extensive research demonstrating the correlation between expressive language and 
functional play in TD children and children with autism (Sigman & Ungerer, 1984).  This 
correlation of language and symbolic play is also found in children with other cognitive 
and language delays such as in expressive Specific Language Impairment (Rescorla & 
Goossens, 1992; Rescorla & Ratner, 1996).  While most researchers refer to 
generalization abilities in the literature, the term is typically used to describe lexical and 
morphological development in language learning to illustrate how children make 
extensions from words that they have just learned (e.g. Brooks, Tomasello, Dodson, & 
Lewis, 2003), such as overextension use of nouns (e.g. after hearing nouns with –s 
endings, calling the plural of foot, as “feets”) and overregularization of verbs (e.g. after 
hearing verbs with –ed endings, saying the past tense of go, as “goed”).  However, 
research by Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra (1979), was the first of its 
kind to theorize an association between language and generalization abilities in symbolic 
play in young children, as described in the current research.  
Although we concluded that the ASD children in this sample performed as well as 
TD children on generalizing novel and familiar events, this does not simply imply that 
insistence on sameness is not a substantive core characteristic of autism that needs 
addressing. Insistence on sameness is a concrete cognitive challenge that affects decision-
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making, often preventing children from moving forward to solve problems when their 
routine is not an option.  The current research has revealed that this type of functional 
fixedness that is typically attributed to autistic cognition by researchers and clinicians 
alike is not a homogenous cognitive ability.  Under some circumstances, some children 
diagnosed with mild- to high-functioning ASD are capable of applying taught skills to 
novel situations in naturalistic settings.  Using the generalized imitation paradigm, a 
clever research method that we found to be age-appropriate for mild- to high-functioning 
children in different diagnostic categories, our results revealed that the ASD children 
performed as well as their typically developing counterparts. Furthermore, contrary to 
previous research (Williams, Costall, & Reddy, 1999), the results also demonstrate that 
some mild- to high-functioning children with ASD are capable of relating to objects and 
people, as some level of joint attention is required to attend to the verbal instructions and 
modeling sequences performed by the experimenter during the tasks.   
This avenue of research seems promising in that results could lead to the design of 
training programs to help those with autism have a more stable yet flexible representation 
of daily life, and to use generalization abilities to enhance their learning in educational 
contexts. Rather than perceiving the characteristics that define autism as “deficits,” in 
light of evidence of cognitive strengths in these individuals, it is our hope that this 
paradigm shift will continue so that researchers and clinicians can refocus their 
perception by targeting these strengths to create training interventions. Such interventions 
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may not only be more effective for these children but may also reduce stigma associated 
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APPENDIX A: Description of Stimuli, Prompts, and Maximum Values for Actions and 
Sequences for Novel and Familiar Tasks 
 
 







Actions and Sequences 
Make a Rattle Modeling: dark violet 
toothbrush holder with 
vertical ridges (2 pieces), 
pink stick*, red cover 
 
Generalization: red 
square cover, teal oblong 
rectangular bottom, small 
ball that looks like an 
orange, dark violet 
toothbrush holder with 
vertical ridges (1 piece)* 
* = distractor 
a. Insert pink stick in 
one piece of toothbrush 
holder (“Put it in!”) 
b. Connect toothbrush 
holder with the other 
end (“Cover it up!”) 
c. Shake constructed 
rattle (“Shake, shake, 
shake!) 
Maximum actions = 3 




  Actions = 3: {a,b,c}      
  Sequences = 2  
   (aàbàc) 
Arbitrary 
  Actions = 0 
  Sequences = 0 










Styrofoam ball with Mr. 
Potato Head plastic eyes 
and blue shoes attached, 
small orange carrot nose, 
white teeth, dark green 




Styrofoam ball with Mr. 
Potato head with eyes 
and feet attached, oval 
crimson nose, crimson 
tongue, light green cap, 
black life-size telephone 
receiver 
a. Put nose on 
Styrofoam ball (“Put on 
the nose”) 
b. Put on mouth (“Put 
on the mouth”) 
c. Put on hat (“Put on 
the hat”) 
d. Bring phone to ear 
(“Ring, ring, ring!  
Hello?”) 
Maximum actions = 4 




   Actions = 0 
   Sequences = 0 
Arbitrary  
   Actions = 4: 
{a,b,c,d} 
   Sequences = 3  
    (aàbàcàd) 
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Actions and Sequences 
Go Swimming Modeling: yellow 
pitcher, metal scissor 
tongs, red and black 





measuring cup, metal 
barbeque tongs with 
wooden handle, green 
wind-up toy frog, 
transparent fishbowl 
a. Pour pretend water 
from pitcher into 
bucket (“Pour in the 
water”) 
b. Wind up toy animal 
and let it walk (“Wind 
it up!) 
c. Catch animal with 
tongs (“Catch him!) 
d. Put animal into water 
bucket (“Put him in. 
Look, he’s swimming!” 
Maximum actions = 4 




  Actions = 2: {a,d} 
  Sequences = 1  
   (aàd)  
Arbitrary  
  Actions = 2: {b,c} 
  Sequences = 2      
   (aàbàc) or 
(bàcàd)   
Make Spaghetti Modeling: silver garlic 
press with white plastic 
handles, Play-Doh in 
container with lid, beige 
plate with dark brown 




Doh extruder, Play-Doh 
(of a different color) in 
small container with lid, 
translucent yellow bowl 
a. Open the container 
and get the dough out 
(“Open the lid”) 
b. Put dough in 
extruder (“Put it in”) 
c. Push/squeeze handle 
(“Squeeze!”) 
d. Retrieve “spaghetti” 
and put on plate 
(“Look, spaghetti!  All 
done!”) 
Maximum actions = 4 




 Actions = 3: {a,b,d} 
 Sequences = 2  
  (aàb) (bàc) 
Arbitrary  
 Actions = 1: {d}  
 Sequences = 1 
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Actions and Sequences 
Make 
Breakfast 
Modeling: brown teddy 
bear, large Apple Jacks 
box (2.75”x4.75”x1.75”), 
white spoon, small jug 
with cover, brown cloth 
 
Generalization: pink 
bunny, small Cheerios 
box (2”x3”x1.75”), red 
spoon, small jug with no 
cover, white bib with 
orange lining and string 
1. Pretend to pour the 
cereal from cereal box 
into bowl (“Pour in the 
cereal”) 
2. Pretend to pour the 
milk from the jug into 
bowl (“Pour in the 
milk”) 
3. Dip spoon in bowl 
and feed stuffed animal 
(“Feed teddy…yum, 
yum, yum”) 
4. Wipe mouth with 
cloth (“Wipe mouth”) 
Maximum actions = 4 










Brush Teeth Modeling: brown teddy 
bear, blue toothbrush, 
travel-size AquaFresh 
toothpaste, small yellow 




bunny, yellow and red 
toothbrush, travel-size 
Crest toothpaste, small 
white cup with handle, 
purple cloth 
1. Put toothpaste on 
toothbrush (“Put on 
toothpaste”) 
2. Brush stuffed 
animal’s teeth with 
toothbrush (“Brush 
teeth”) 
3. Rinse mouth by 
giving stuffed animal a 
drink from the cup 
(“Rinse mouth”) 
4. Wipe mouth with 
cloth (“Wipe mouth”) 
Maximum actions = 4 
 
Maximum sequences = 
3 
 
Conventional actions  
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Actions and Sequences 




with slots (bed), green 
cloth (blanket), large 
4.75”x5”x.75” storybook 
(“Things I Like”), onesie 
with dark purple bodice 
and pink trim with snap 
bottom with word 




pink stuffed bunny, white 
9”x6”x2” rectangular 
container (bed), pink 
cloth (blanket), small 
4”x4”x1” storybook, red 
and black velvet shirt 
1. Put on clothes (“Put 
on PJ’s”) 
2. “Read” stuffed 
animal a story by 
flipping pages in story 
book quickly (“Read 
teddy a story”) 
3. Put stuffed animal to 
bed (“Put teddy to 
bed”) 
4. Cover stuffed animal 
with blanket (“Cover 
him up”) 
Maximum actions = 4 
 
Maximum sequences = 
3 
 
Conventional actions  






Bath Time Modeling: brown teddy 
bear, blue 7.5”x6”x3” 
container (tub), circular 







1.75”x3x1.5” soap, green 
cloth (towel) 
1. Put stuffed animal 
into tub (“Put him in the 
tub”) 
2. Wash stuffed animal 
with soap (“Wash him”) 
3. Take bear out of the 
tub (“Take him out of 
the tub”) 
4. Dry bear with cloth 
(“Dry him”) 
Maximum actions = 4 
Maximum sequences = 
3 
Conventional actions  
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APPENDIX B: Stimuli Used in Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3 
Modeling and Generalization Props Used in Novel Tasks 
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APPENDIX B: Stimuli Used in Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3 (cont’d) 
	  
Modeling and Generalization Props Used in Familiar Tasks 
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